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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
THE SELF, SUBJECTIVITY, AND IMPETUS FOR LATINO MALE SELF-
TRANSFORMATION IN THE WRITINGS OF KIERKEGAARD 
The following thesis will explore the relationship between the conceptions of the
self and subjectivity in writings of 19th century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard 
and the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Kierkegaard’s 
conception of the self will take Sickness Unto Death (1849) as the focal point, while 
Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity will be explored in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript (1846). First, I will discuss three aspects of Kierkegaard’s dialectical self: the 
irresolute self, the resolute self, and the religious dependent self. Second, after these 
aspects of the self are discussed, I turn my attention to Kierkegaard’s concepti  of 
subjectivity. The discussion on subjectivity will explore four perspectives of subjectivity: 
objective and subjective thinking, subjectivity and indirect communication, subjectivity 
as inwardness, existence, and passion, and lastly subjectivity and truth. Third, I discuss 
David T. Abalos’ theory of transformation in The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition 
(2002). My discussion of Abalos’ theory of transformation will focus on the Thr e Acts 
of the Core Drama of Life in its application to Latino male self-transformation. My aim is 
to take Kierkegaard’s remarks on the self and subjectivity and apply them to Abalos’ 
theory of Latino male self-transformation. I attempt to demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s 
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remarks on these issues can inform and aid in the conversation of the contemporary 
problem of Latino male self-transformation. Thus, I argue that Kierkegaard’s remarks on 
the self and subjectivity are not only invaluable to this contemporary problem, but can 
provide impetus for Latino male self-transformation. 
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What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the 
Academy and the Church? … Our instructions come from “the porch of Solomon” … 
Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic 
composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus…! 
 
Tertullian, ecclesiastical writer in the second and third centuries, didn’t just make 
the remarks above in passing, but rather made it his life’s passion to keep philosophy 
(Athens) away from the teachings and the doctrines of the early Christian Church 
(Jerusalem).1 Philosophy, in Tertullian’s mind, was not welcomed in the domain of the 
sacred Church because philosophy had nothing positive to offer. It could not elucidate, 
clarify, nor assist the teachings of the Christian Church in any useful way.  
My concern here will not be the relationship between the Christian Church and 
philosophy, nor will it be the relationship between faith and reason. Instead, my focus 
will address the relationship between philosophy and the contemporary problem of 
Latino male self-transformation. In order to get at this relationship perhas I could recast 
Tertullian’s question and ask, “What indeed has Athens to do with El Barrio?”  In other 
words, what does philosophy have to do with the problems and issues facing Latino 
males? Similar to Tertullian, some may be convinced that philosophy should remain
within its own confines of reason and philosophical quandaries. In addition, some may be 
                                                          
 
1Tertullian made this remarks in, De Praescriptione Haereticorum (Prescription against Heretics), 
T.D. Barnes, Tertullian: a literary and historical study (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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convinced that philosophy would simply be a “fish out of water” when it comes to 
dealing with real-life practical and contemporary concerns. I am persuaded that the latter 
sentiments are wrong. I’m convinced, and I hope to convince the readers as well, that 
philosophy is not only useful in elucidating and clarifying problems facing Latinos males, 
but philosophy can also make positive contributions to Latino/a studies.  
The particular area of philosophy that I will draw from and will thus inform my 
discussion of Latino male self-transformation will be from the work and writing of 19th 
century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. The present thesis is an inquiry into the 
problem of Latino male self-transformation (the subject of chapter three) in and through a 
Kierkegaardian lens (the subject of chapters one and two). I will take Kierkegaard’s 
remarks on the self and subjectivity and bring them to bear on the problem of Latino male 
self-transformation. If I am correct, this thesis will demonstrate that aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy can indeed inform, assist, and provide impetus for Latino male 
self-transformation. Thus, Athens has a legitimate and invaluable concern with El Barrio! 
Before I move forward in this task, I think it’s necessary to briefly address and 
alleviate some concerns regarding this work. First, some may question the legi imacy of 
philosophy “informing” and “assisting” in contemporary Latino issues. That is, some 
may object by saying, “shouldn’t such areas of study be left up to the Ethnic studies, 
Latino studies, and Sociology departments?”  Well, that’s certainly true. I will not 
attempt to address Latino/a issues in and of themselves…that task can properly be l ft up 
to the experts in those fields of study. As a philosopher, my concern here is a 
philosophical approach to Latino male self-transformation, not a sociological approach.  
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Second, some may object to my choice of Kierkegaard as the particular 
philosopher that should address Latino issues in the first place. “Why Kierkegaad,” why 
not Latino philosophers like Francisco Romero or Risieri Fronsizi instead?2 What could a 
White European existentialist philosopher have to say on the matters pertaining to Latino 
males? My response is two-fold.  
First, although I don’t doubt that Latino philosophers are adept at dealing with 
Latino issues; however, from a practical point of view, the majority of my philosophical 
work and my philosophical exposure has been limited to White European philosophy. 
Thus, at this point in my philosophical career, I am far more equipped at dealing with 
Latino issues through a White European philosophical set of lens.  
Second, there need not be any major concern at approaching Latino issues 
through a White European philosophical lens because such an approach has been going 
on for some time now in and through the work of Karl Marx. Marx’s philosophical 
insights are not rejected a priori merely because he is a White European philosopher; 
thus, Kierkegaard need not be dismissed out right simply because of his race and 
ethnicity either.  
I will be presenting a philosophical perspective on the self-transformation of the 
Latino male in contemporary times. My examination of this topic will be done in and 
through the lens of 19th century Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. In particular, I 
will explore Kierkegaard’s notions of the self and subjectivity and then discuss Latino 
male self-transformation in light of Kierkegaard’s insights on these topics. 
                                                          
 
2Gracia, Jorge J.E., and Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, eds. Latin American Philosophy for the 21st 
Century (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004) p. 89-122. 
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Thesis: The Self, Subjectivity, and Impetus for Latino Male Self-Transformation in the 
Writings of Kierkegaard.  
In chapter One, I will discuss the notion of the self presented in Kierkegaard’s 
Sickness Unto Death in order to shed light on the Latino male self and the difficulties of 
self-transformation (the topic of discussion for the last chapter). Kierkegaard’s notion of 
the self, I will argue, provides a useful standpoint to approach the “problem” facing 
Latino males. Of course, Kierkegaard was obviously not interested in problems reated to 
ethnicity and Latino/a identity in particular; however, he was interested in the lived 
experience and existence of the individual enveloped in his or her own unique historical 
situation. The type of authentic existence Kierkegaard argued for involves a unique 
dialectical conception of the self. I will attempt to demonstrate (in Chapter 3) that this 
conception can prove useful and fruitful for providing insight into the contemporary 
problem of Latino male self-transformation.  
Chapter Two will explore Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity in The Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. I will discuss Kierkegaard’s 
notion of subjectivity in order to elucidate a certain way of thinking about the problem of 
existence. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity amounts to a unique way of thinking and actig 
about our own existence. In particular, Kierkegaardian “subjectivity” conveys elements 
of inwardness, existence, and passion. The later elements, I will argue, can inform and 
direct Latino male self-transformation.   
The final chapter will be devoted to discussing Latino male self-transformati n. I 
will explore the problem of Latino male self-transformation by exploring David T. 
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Abalos’ theory of transformation in and through a Kierkegaardian lens. I will argue that 
the task of self-transformation is a kin to Kierkegaard’s ethical task to transfo m the self 
from a one-sided and partial self into a whole and complete self. I will discuss the need 
for Latino male transformation with the help of specific Kierkegaardian themes discussed 
in chapters one and two on the self and subjectivity. Finally, I will conclude that such 





Chapter I – Kierkegaard’s Self: the Dialectical Self 
Introduction
I am well aware of the difficultly in writing anything about Søren Kierkegaard. 
The difficulties are numerous: distinguishing the voice of Kierkegaard among his 
pseudonyms, penetrating the opaque anti-systematic philosophical writing style of 
Kierkegaard, and sifting through the various interpretations of Kierkegaard’s work.3  
However, these difficulties don’t necessarily short circuit any attempts to spell out 
Kierkegaard’s notion of the self and thus need not detain us here. 
I will deal primarily with aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought related to the self in, 
Sickness Unto Death.4  The aim of my discussion is to locate a notion of the self for 
                                                          
 
3 Certainly, the issue of pseudonymity raises a number of problems: discerning Kierkegaard’s 
voice behind the pseudonyms (if indeed there is a so-called “one true voice” behind the voices of the 
pseudonyms), the purpose of employing the pseudonyms, and how they (the pseudonyms) are to be 
approached. Although it is difficult to understand Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship without first
understanding his theory of indirect communication (I will discuss this later in the paper), it will suffice 
here to point out that the pseudonyms do not necessarily hold the same views and opinions as Kierkegaard 
and vice versa. However, one is able to compare the pseudonymous works with the works that Kierkegaard 
published under his own name in order to see agreement and disagreement. The pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus comes closest to Kierkegaard’s own view; however, it would be a mistake to say that Climacus’ 
and Kierkegaard’s voices are equivalent. Moreover, any reader of Kierkegaard must take into account 
Kierkegaard’s own request, in “First and Last Declaration,” that anyone who wishes to quote from his 
pseudonymous authorship that they attribute the words to the pseudonym not Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, 
amid the difficulties surrounding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity, I’m persuaded that the purpose of the 
pseudonyms was to distance Kierkegaard from the reade . That is to say, he wanted to leave the reader 
alone with the text in order to struggle with the text and come to conclusions for him or herself. For m e 
on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity see Merold Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1996), chapter two.  
Also see C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press International, Inc., 1983) p.6-11. 
 
4 Sickness Unto Death was written between March and May, 1848; however, Kierkegaard delayed 
its publication until July of 1849. Before publishing this work, Kierkegaard changed the author from S. 
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Kierkegaard in order to illuminate Latino male self-transformation (the topic of chapter 
three). As I proceed to achieve this aim, a mistaken (although very popular) reading of 
Kierkegaard will be exposed along the way. Kierkegaard, the father of Existentialism, is 
often thought to be thoroughly anti-metaphysical. However, it must be remembered that 
even if one is anti-systematic, for surely Kierkegaard is anti-systematic, it doesn’t follow 
that one necessarily repudiates metaphysics. As we shall see, Kierkegaard’s conception 
the self is a rich hybrid notion encompassing both metaphysical and social/relat onal 
aspects. That is, while Kierkegaard assiduously puts forward a metaphysical not on of the 
self, he never loses sight of the individual’s responsibility to “self-create,” lbeit self-
creation takes place within certain ontological parameters. 
This chapter will be organized around three focal points. First, I begin 
constructing the foundation of Kierkegaard’s notion of the self by briefly discussing 
G.W.F. Hegel’s understanding of the self. 5 Second, I turn to Kierkegaard’s conception of 
the self in Sickness Unto Death. Final, I discuss aspects of Kierkegaard’s self that will be 
picked up in chapter three in my discussion of Latino male self-transformation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kierkegaard to Anti-Climacus, putting himself as the editor of the work. The pseudonym Anti-Climacus 
will be discussed shortly.  
 
5 When talking about the concept of the self it is important to make subtle distinctions. The nature 
of the self is a metaphysical problem that should not be confused with the epistemological problem of 
having knowledge of the nature of the self. That is, if there is such a thing called the self, then how does 
one come to have knowledge of the self? Second, the concept of the self is not the same as the metaphysical 
mind and body problem. Although discussions on the nature of the self may overlap with certain 
discussions on the mind and body problem, they’re distinct philosophical problems and should not be 
confused. The metaphysical self or ego concerns spelling out the nature the self as it relates to personal 
identity. Some have defined the self as just pan-psychical activity and some have understood the self as just 
physiological processes. Others have understood the self as a synthesis of both mind and body. On the o r 
hand, the metaphysical mind and body problem seeks to understand the relationship between mind and 
body, and has generated both dualistic and monistic accounts of this relationship. 
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G. W. F. Hegel’s conception of the Self 
For my purposes, Hegel’s understanding of the self will be primarily limited to 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel’s philosophy is quite obscure and difficult, but a brief 
discussion of what the self amounts to for Hegel is necessary in order to gain an accur te 
picture of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self.6 For Hegel, a notion of the self emerges 
in the context of his system. System, for Hegel, refers to his ambitious philosophical 
project of synthesizing all human knowledge and culture into a single rational system in 
order to reveal that the entirety of human knowledge and culture has progressed and has 
an underlying purpose. 7 The task of Hegel’s system, then, is two-fold: one, to help us see 
that the world is indeed rational and two, to help us achieve absolute knowledge.  For 
Hegel, the world is rational in that it has a rational order and this rational order is 
something that humanity will find contentment in. However, the latter contentment only 
comes about if we look at the world correctly (Stern 2002). The task of helping humanity 
“see the world correctly”, then, is a task left to philosophy. Philosophy (Hegel’s notion of 
philosophy as science) has the noble task of helping humanity to see the world through 
                                                          
 
6For more on the relationship between Hegel and Kierkegaard see Merold Wesphal’s essay, 
Kierkegaard and Hegel in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 101-124. 
 
7Perhaps there were historical and political motivations for Hegel’s system such as witnessing, on 
one hand, the highpoints of the French Revolution and certainly the low points of the Revolution in the 
bloody aftermath of the Terror. In addition, there was also the aftermath of Kant’s Copernican Revolution 
that served as impetus for Post-Kantian Idealists and Romanticism. Many of Kant’s successors felt the ne d 
to go further than Kant and “rectify” his work because they were convinced that it left us at a skeptical dead 
end or because it left the subject divided between a self compatible with the sciences and a self affirming 
ethics, for more on Post-Kantian Idealist systems see, Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Vol. 
VII, from the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierekegaard, and Nietzsche (New York, New York: Double 
Day, 1963) p. 1-31. Copleston is persuaded that Hegel sought to seam together these major historical, 
political, and philosophical rifts and oppositions i  his all encompassing system.   
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the correct set of lens.8 Looking at the world correctly amounts to “seeing” the whole 
truth; having absolute knowledge, not merely limited or partial knowledge. It is Hegel’s 
dialectical method then, that helps us see that thinking in terms of exclusively cat gory A 
eventually leads to a contradiction with category B and conversely, category B leads to a 
contradiction with category A. This state of affairs eventually leads to the formation of a 
new category C in which this new category C paradoxically preserves both A and B but 
also does away with A and B (Forster 1993). Take for example, the seemingly 
incompatible and conflicting ideas of freedom and necessity. For Hegel, the problem 
arises when we reject dialectical thinking and tend to over-emphasize freedom at the 
expense of necessity or conversely necessity at the expense of freedom. Both one-sided 
moves are mistakes, which ultimately leads to despair. For this very reason, Hegel’s 
system is referred to as dialectical because absolute truth is obtained only when we 
overcome looking at the world through an “either/ or” lens and come to understand the 
world through a “both/and” lens.9 Only philosophy, Hegel believes, can elevate the mind 
to a level of dialectical thinking in order to overcome the rigidity of concepts of 
understanding (Verstand), and thus freeing us from apparent oppositions such as, the one 
and many, freedom and necessity, and the infinite and the finite. Hegel’s project of 
freeing us from these apparent illusions and puzzles begin with his works, Hegel’s Logic: 
                                                          
 
8When Hegel refers to philosophy as science, he doesn’t have in mind what we think of when we 
use the term, ‘science’ referring to the scientific method and empirical data. In the German tradition, 
“Wissenschaft” or “science” refers to philosophy as science because of its all-encompassing nature in that it 
seeks absolute truth from the various disciplines such as, ethics, history, politics, religion, mathematics, and 
the sciences.  
   
9 For more on Hegel’s dialectical method see, Michael Forster in Cambridge Companion to Hegel: 
Hegel’s dialectical method. Although the term, ‘dialectical’ is frequently used to refer to Hegel’s 
philosophy, Hegel actually uses the term, ‘dialectic’ sparingly, and when he does use the term he refers to 
the three stages of the development of thought: 1) the abstract side (understanding), 2)  the dialectical side 
(negative reason), and 3) speculative (positive reason).  
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Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and continues 
through the Phenomenology of Spirit.10 But what role does the Phenomenology of Spirit 
play in Hegel’s philosophical system? 
Phenomenology of Spirit was released in 1806 amid much controversy and is 
considered Hegel’s greatest work.11 In order to expose where consciousness has gone 
wrong because it has rejecting dialectical thinking, the task of Phenomenology of Spirit is
to trace the development of consciousness (individual and social) through its various
ways of thinking about the world and itself. That is, consciousness will be examined 
(from the inside so to speak) in order to show how more limited forms of consciousness 
necessarily lead to more adequate forms of consciousness culminating in absolute 
knowledge. Phenomenology begins by spelling out the most primitive forms of 
consciousness, what Hegel calls, certainty at the level of sense-experience, to perception 
and on to force and the understanding, which leads to consciousness thinking about 
itself. The focus shifts from how consciousness conceives of things in the world to howit 
conceives of itself as subject. It is in Hegel’s discussion on self-consciousness that his 
conception of the self emerges. For Hegel, self-consciousness cannot exist in complete 
isolation; it needs some “other” object than itself to set itself apart. That is, I cannot 
                                                          
 
10Hegel thinks that these conceptual puzzles can be resolved once we are in place to rethink our 
categories of universal, particular, and individual, which are translated in English as, “Concept” or 
“Notion,” from the German, Begriff, Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (London: 
Routledge Talyor & Francis Group, 2002). 
 
11 For more on textual criticism and the events surrounding the release of Phenomenology of Spirit 
see Robert Pippin, ‘You Can’t Get  From Here to There: Translation Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, d. Frederick C, Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993): 52-85.  
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become aware of myself nor have a proper conception of myself as subject qua subject 
without some entity external to myself. 
If we call Notion what the object is n itself, but call the object what it is qua object or for an 
other, then it is clear that being-in itself and being –for-an-other are one and the same. For the in-
itself is consciousness; but equally it is that for which an other (the in-itself) is; and it is for 
consciousness that in-itself of the object, and the being of the object for an other, are one and the 
same; the ‘I’ is the content of the connection itself. Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and 
at the same time it overarches this other which, for the ‘I’, is equally only the ‘I’ itself (PS, 104).  
  
For Hegel, the subject desires another object to preserve its own individuality, but this 
inevitability leads to the subject opposing and destroying the object because to desire 
something is to possess it and control it. Hegel writes, “thus self-consciousness, by it  
negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that 
relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well” (PS 109). However, is 
any object external to the subject sufficient for self-consciousness? That is, will any 
object such as a book or a chair external to the subject satisfy the conditions for self-
consciousness? Hegel answers the latter in the negative by arguing that another subject 
(not merely an object) is not only required for self-consciousness, but another self-
conscious subject is necessary for self-consciousness; s lf-consciousness achieves its 
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness (PS 110). However, a problem arises 
because wouldn’t another self-conscious subject want to impose its will on me just as I 
would want to on it? For Hegel, this inevitably leads to a life and death struggle and will 
not be resolved until one concedes defeat and thereby becomes slave while the victor 
becomes master. Hegel seems to have something a bit more in mind than merely a life 
and death struggle because of desire when he remarks, “Self-consciousness exists in and 
for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged” (PS 111). Perhaps what Hegel was getting at was that recognition leads to 
the “life and death struggle” not merely desire.  
12 
 
If two self-consciousnesses occupy center stage, then each consciousness 
“equally” needs and depends on the other’s “recognition” to establish his or her own 
consciousness. However, each self not only finds gratification in the recognition of the 
“other” consciousness, but desires to master, control, and rule over the “other” 
consciousness.  This leads to a life and death struggle, which eventually produces an 
interdependent master- slave relationship. The master needs acknowledgment and 
recognition from the slave just as the slave needs acknowledgment and recognition from 
the master.12 In sum, Hegel’s notion of the self is relational in that it requires 
consciousness of the “other” external to itself and involves struggle and conflict in order 
to maintain the self. Kierkegaard’s self, as we shall see, also involves “other” self-
consciousness and “struggles and conflicts,” but with an anti-Hegelian twist. 
Kierkegaard’s conception of the Self 
Before going straight away to tackle Kierkegaard’s notion of the self, there ar  
three historical-contextual matters that need to be explained in order to have a full 
appreciation of Kierkegaard’s remarks on the self. These contextual matters are as 
follows and will be taken up in the same order: 1) the absence of the self in the midst of 
19th century Christian Denmark, and the disappearance of Christianity from Christendom, 
2) Anti-Climacus casts himself as a physician treating a spiritual and social illness that 
has gripped his Denmark, and 3) the diagnosis and prescription for these ills are found 
within Sickness Unto Death (from this point forward I will refer to Sickness Unto Death as 
SUD ). 
                                                          
 
12Karl Marx would later develop Hegel’s Slave and Master chapter in the Phenomenology into his 
own notion of alienated labor by arguing that man’s nature is the result of his labor.   
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First, for Kierkegaard via the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, there are two significant 
moments that 19th century Christian Denmark faced, one following from the other, that he 
seeks to set right.13 The individual (Kierkegaard sometimes calls particularity) had been 
suffocated by the absolutization of society (Hegelian Denmark). That is, the “I” ad 
essentially been reduced to the “We,” whereby the “We” had usurped God’s place in her 
socio-historical apotheosis. Society’s self-deification had drained away the ethical-
religious commitments of the individual and her task to stand alone before God. For Anti-
Climacus, his “fellow-Christians” had mistakenly assumed that one’s existential task was 
automatically completed and brought to fruition merely because the individual had been 
“properly socialized.” In reality, they, the social “We” had deified itself by absolutizing 
society; thereby, confusing society with God (Westphal 1991).14 
                                                          
 
13Kierkegaard borrows the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, from John Climacus the seven-century 
Christian monk at the monastery on Mount Sinai. John Climacus wrote, Klimax tou Paradeisou (Latter to 
Paradise) and as a result of this book John was describ d as the Climacus, “the climber of the ladder.” 
Kierkegaard attaches the pseudonym Johannes Climacus to his works, De omnibus dubitandum est, 
Philosophical Fragments, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript and the pseudonym Anti-Climacus in his 
works, Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity. The prefix “Anti” doesn’t refer to opposed or 
against, rather Kierkegaard attaches the prefix “Anti” to Climacus in order to bring out, against the 
Christians in Denmark of his day and perhaps even Ki rkegaard himself, the idea that Climacus is above in 
rank or an “advanced” Christian. Hong writes, “The pr fix “Anti” may be misleading; however, it does not 
mean “against.” It is an old form of “ante (before), as in “anticipate,” and “before” also denotes a rel tion 
of rank, as in “before me” in the First Commandment” (Hong 2000). That is, Anti-Climacus is committed 
to the Christian worldview in that he knows what it means to stand alone before God, while Johannes 
Climacus doesn’t regard himself as a Christian. 
14I find interesting parallels between Kierkegaard’s social climate regarding the status of the 
individual and contemporary American society’s call for individual social identities, racial or ethnic, to be 
absorbed into the democratic “We.” Many today think that individual identity is unnecessary or perhaps 





Moreover, Anti- Climacus’ contemporary Christian society had fallen prey to a 
disease and “sickness” that had devoured the age.15 In general terms, the sickness can be 
described as the disappearance of Christianity from Christendom. Similar to Nietzsche’s 
critique of society, as Westphal notes, Anti-Climacus sees the disease as a “herd”16 
disease in that mass society is defiantly maintaining a Hegelian Christian metaphysic 
devoid of Christian practice, but all that remains is an empty husk (Westphal 1991).  
Second, there is a sense in which Anti-Climacus sees himself as a physician 
diagnosing a serious illness whereby it is imperative that his audience take heed. Mass 
society, because it has continued to run from appropriating the Christian beliefs they 
continue to profess has become “spiritless.” That is, they have become self-less without 
being conscious of such a malady; such a fear of conscious selfhood is what Anti- 
Climacus calls despair. Anti-Climacus goes through a step by step diagnosis of the 
sickness, what he calls despair in part I of the book and what he calls sin in part II, in 
order to bring about increased levels of self-awareness. Complicating the task for Anti-
Climacus is that he “detects in contemporary life-styles, in the kinds of goals people set 
for themselves, in their ideals of fulfillment, a fundamental fear of conscious selfhood” 
(Hannay 1989). The forms of despair, which Anti-Climacus seeks to bring to the open, 
                                                          
 
15 For more on the historical situation of, Sickness Unto Death, see Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: 
A Biography (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2001), p. 374-386. 
 
16Merold Westphal points to the uncanny parallel betwe n Nietzsche and Kierkegaard in their 
critiques of society. For Nietzsche, the “death of G d” and the aftermath produced the “herd” disease 
whereby mass society had long since disowned the Christian metaphysic; however, was unwilling to leave 
behind the Christian morality. On the other hand, for Kierkegaard, the “herd” disease was cashed out in 
terms mass society holding on to the theoretical Christian doctrines (albeit Hegelianizing those Christian 
doctrines), while leaving behind its Christian ethic. Health, Nietzsche thought, could be restored to society 
by completely breaking from Christianity, while for Kierkegaard, health could only be restored via a return 
to the true faith. For more on Kierkegaard’s social ritique see, Merold Westphal Kierkegaard’s Critique of 
Reason and Society (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1991), chapter four, 
Kierkegaard’s Sociology.  
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are those that are particularly defiant against conscious selfhood. The solution to this 
despair and anxiety is found in the individual resolutely choosing to exist in faith before 
Anti-Climacus’ vision of God.  
Third, SUD, then, is a treatment of the problem of despair and the antidote to the 
problem. The first part of the book analyzes despair by discussing three forms of despair, 
which are described as 1) lack of consciousness of being a self, 2) despair of not willing 
to be a self, and 3) despair of willing to be a self. All forms of despair are the sult of the 
individual failing to be an authentic self (the failure to be a human being in fullest 
possible sense, which for Anti-Climacus is a religious self). In part two of SUD, Anti-
Climacus analyzes despair in and through Christian conceptual categories of God, sin, 
and faith.  
We can proceed to discuss Kierkegaard’s conception of the self as presented in 
SUD. The self is defined as a triadic being or three structure being. In other words, 
Kierkegaard understands the self17 as 1) a synthesis of opposing factors, 2) a relation that 
relates itself to itself, and 3) a relation grounded by the “other.” Under the pseudonym 
Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard writes these words on the self: 
                                                          
 
17 There is some dispute concerning the exact nature of Kierkegaard’s style of philosophizing 
about human nature: was Kierkegaard engaging in philosophical psychology or philosophical anthropology 
or both?  I think it is safe to say that Kierkegaard was philosophizing about the human condition and the 
nature of human existence; however, the method that he utilized most often was playing role of the clini al 
psychologist, diagnosing mental errors and then providing solutions to those errors. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to Kierkegaard’s remarks on the nature of the self there is a variety of opinion among 
Kierkegaardian scholars about the type of philosophizing Kierkegaard set on display. For example, Louis 
Pojman in, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, calls Kierkegaard’s analysis of “the self” and “human 
existence” a work of both phenomenology and religious anthropology. Gregor Malantschuk in, 
Kierkegaard’s Thought, refers to Kierkegaard’s authorship in so much as it was concerned with the human 
subject as, “anthropological contemplation.” Merold Westphal regards Kierkegaard’s remarks on the self 





The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a
relation which relates to itself, or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the s lf is 
not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the 
infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the etrnal, of freedom and necessity, in short a 
synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between the two. Considered in this way, a human being is still 
not a self. 
In a relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the 
relation, and in the relation to that relation; thus under the qualification of the psychical the 
relation between the psychical and the physical is  relation. If, however, the relation relates itself 
to itself, then this relation is the positive third, and this is the self. 
Such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established itself or have been 
established by another. 
If the relation that relates itself to itself has been established by another, then the relation is indeed 
that third, but this relation, the third, is yet again a relation and relates itself to that which 
established the entire relation (SUD 43). 
After reading such a passage one may feel a certain sickness unto death, and it is no 
wonder that, as Alastair Hannay has noted, some have thought that Kierkegaard was 
deliberately parodying Hegel.18 Anti-Climacus begins by saying the human being is 
spirit; however, he quickly qualifies the definition of the self in Hegelian garb. He goes 
on to define the self as, “a relation that relates itself to itself…a human being is a 
synthesis….such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established 
itself or have been established by another.” What does all this amount to?  
Anti-Climacus begins SUD by defining the self (Selvet) as spirit (Aand). “What is 
spirit?” he asks. Spirit, he goes on, is the self. But, Anti-Climacus further questions, 
“What is the self?” He goes on to cash out the self in terms of a three-part structure. 
Again, lest we forget, Anti-Climacus is not discussing the self merely as an exercise in 
                                                          
 
18 In his introductory remarks to SUD, Hannay notes that some commentators have read 
Kierkegaard’s opening remarks in SUD as a deliberate p rody of the, “impenetrability of Hegelian prose.” 
Hannay suggests that this way of reading Kierkegaard is wrong-headed and that Kierkegaard’s obscure 
opening remarks serves as a table of contents for the remainder of the book rather than a parody of Hegel. I 
don’t see why it cannot be both a parody and also serve as a table of contents for the remainder of the book. 




speculative philosophy, but rather to present an account of the despair (in its various 
forms conscious and unconscious despair) that had gripped the present age. For Anti-
Climacus, spirit (Aand), refers to the third element that unites both body and soul.19 
Against Hegel, spirit, for Anti-Climacus doesn’t refer to the third movement in the 
dialectic of soul-consciousness-spirit, but rather refers to a third element of the person in 
addition to the physical body and soul.20 Immediately we should notice that Anti-
Climacus’ self is not merely Descartes’ dualistic self of mind and body, but rather a 
composite of soul (Sjæl), translated as “psyche,” and physical body, both united by 
spirit.21 Richard J. Colledge, regarding Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘spirit’ writes: 
In itself, it [spirit] is neither a source of good nor evil; in being the foundation of consciousness, it 
is rather the condition of possibility for both. Spirit is the gnawing voice within that breathes fire 
and intensity into human existence, driving it along the difficult road toward fulfillment of its 
potentiality. Thus, spirit is of the essence of human being (Colledge).  
As we proceed, what exactly ‘spirit’ amounts to and the role that it plays in Kierkegaard 
notion of the self will become clear, but now to exposit in greater detail on each aspect of 
                                                          
 
19 For Kierkegaard, ‘spirit’ is used in different ways, but unfortunately he didn’t always clarify the 
ways in which he used his terms. Richard J. Colledge in, Kierkegaard’s Subjective Ontology: A 
Metaphysics of the Existing Individual, suggests that Kierkegaard’s Aand, Hegel’s Geist both refer to the 
essential element needed for human flourishing, but with Hegel ‘spirit’ is “at once human and divine,” 
whereas with Kierkegaard, ‘spirit’ is, “an eminently human category…that appears to function as an innate 
human “faculty” that operates by unsettling the individual through awakening it to its eternal te os” p.10.  
Westphal points out that Kierkegaard used ‘spirit’ in much the same way that Hegel used the term. 
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 For Hegel, the Absolute or Spirit is engaged in the process of becoming what he truly is; thus, 
coming to full self-consciousness requires an object to be conscious of. Only in humanity has this otherness 
been overcome because man is the highest expression of Spirit. Human history is the history of spirit 
becoming aware of itself as Spirit. 
 
21Although it is clear that Anti-Climacus has features of a dualistic account of the human being as 
both body and mind, but he adds a third element, spirit; it is not clear if spirit is the creation of the 
individual properly synthesizing body and mind together or if spirit is an external entity assisting the 
individual in her task of holding both body and mind together. Louis Pojman in, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy 
of Religion, concerning spirit remarks, “Man is a composite being, a synthesis of soul and body which are 
related or brought together as opposing forces, producing an entity (synthesis of spirit) which is greater 
than the sum of its parts, a self or spirit, italicize mine p.32. 
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this triadic being. I will refer to each aspect of the triadic being as follows: the irresolute 
self, the resolute self, and the spiritual dependent self.  
The Irresolute Self 
For Anti-Climacus, the first major component of the self is what I refer to ashe 
irresolute self, which comes to the fore in the tension between the physical body and the 
soul. The irresolute self is defined as a ynthesis (Synthese) of contrasting factors: 
infinite-finite, eternal-temporal, and freedom (later he calls possibility)-necessity.22 It is 
worth noting that Anti-Climacus assumes that one does not and cannot understand the 
self as just a physical entity nor as just pan psychical activity, but ratherhumanity is both 
body and mind, which taken together is regarded as the first component of the self.  
The first aspect of the self, then, is the self as a synthesis of mind and body. 
However, Anti-Climacus goes on to point out that mind and body have their respective 
elements that need to be properly synthesized.  Anti-Climacus remarks, “A human being 
is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and 
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 In, The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Work, John D. Glenn 
understands Kierkegaard’s definition of the self in SUD as not only fundamental to exploring the entir 
SUD work but also key to understanding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous corpus. Glenn proceeds by 
discussing Kierkegaard tripartite definition of the self, and then explicates how this definition corresponds 
to the three parts of Sickness Unto Death. Furthermore, Glenn considers how this tripartite definition of the 
self relates to Kierkegaard’s rich notion of “the stages of existence” throughout his pseudonymous works. 
For example, Glenn observes the first dimension of the self (the self as polar opposites) as corresponding to 
the aesthetic stage of existence described in volume one of Either/Or. The pseudonymous author of the 
former work, “A” paints a picture of an individual that is characterized by vacillating between the poles of 
infinitude/finitude, necessity/possibility, and eternity/temporality. For example, Glenn points to A’s 
rendering of the esthetical individual who struggles to carve out authentic meaning and existence becaus  
of her own non-commitment and irresolution. The aesth tic individual, in an attempt to transform her life, 
is taken in moments, via the imagination, of postulating grandiose possibilities; yet, fails to actualize any of 
these possibilities and consequently remains bound to her necessity. Moreover, the esthetic individual fails 
to unify the eternal and temporal aspects of the self a  synthesis by “keeping free from all temporal 




necessity, in short a synthesis” (SUD, 13). The body, for Anti-Climacus, is the factual 
pole of humanity which is exemplified by the particular elements of the finite, the 
temporal, and necessity. That is, these elements make up one’s facticity. On the other 
hand, the elements of the infinite, the eternal, and freedom correspond to the soul or 
psyche as the hyperbolic pole of the human being. This first relation (or mis-relation) of 
contrasting factors is diagnosed by Anti-Climacus in the context of deficiency and 
excess; therefore giving raise to despair. That is, the malady plaguing the self described 
in this subdivision is a result of an over emphasis (or under emphasis) of the particular 
elements of the synthesis. A more detailed account of what exactly these dialectical 
elements of the irresolute self refer to is in order.  
The finite element refers to the person’s biological, physiological, economical, 
social, and political features and determinants such as, one’s behavior, height, income,
social status etc. On the other hand, the infinite element refers to one’s momentary escape 
from the finite determinants and facticity in the sense that one can, via the imagination, 
transcend the narrow limits by imagining otherwise. The imagination plays a key role in 
the development of the authentic self, for Anti-Climacus. When imagination is used 
properly it can be the catalyst wherein authentic selfhood emerges or when used 
improperly can shipwreck one’s life on the rocks of despair,  
It [imagination] is not a faculty like the other faculties- if one wish to speak this way, it is the 
faculty instar omnium [for all faculties]…what feelings, understanding and will a person has 
depends in the last resort upon what imagination he has- on how the latter reflects upon himself, 
that is, upon imagination…the imagination is the whole of reflection’s possibility; and the 
intensity of this medium is the possibility of the s lf’s intensity (SUD, 60-61). 
The error, for Anti-Climacus, is to emphasize the infinite element over and against the 
finite and vice versa. That is, when the self’s infinitude is emphasized over and agai st 
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the self’s finitude the result is infinitude’s despair in that the self is lost in a state of 
“vaporous sentimentality in sheer proliferation of objective knowledge or in fantastic 
projects.”23  For example, the despair of the infinitude of the self one might think of a 
Walter Mitty figure imaging “fantastic projects” for the self while n ver taking the 
initiative to actualize any of these projects due to weakness of the will. A contemporary 
example helps illustrate this point further. Consider Maria, a Latina, while working in the 
service sector she empties trash bins, cleans bathrooms, and mops floors; yet, 
imaginatively conceives of a different socio-economic situation that places her working 
in upper management. That is, for a brief moment a different self emerges in Maria’s 
imagination. But for whatever reason (personal fear, lack of education and resources), 
Maria never wills and acts on these “august” projects. There is sense in which refle ting 
upon and “imagining” different social situations is absurd for Maria because it is now the 
cause of her personal anguish. Maria’s reflecting via the imagination on what could have 
been becomes the source of personal injury and despair, “the self then leads a fantastic 
existence in abstract infinitization or in abstract isolation, constantly lacking its self, from 
which it simply gets further and further away” (SUD, 62). On the other hand, finitude’s 
despair results in the individual being locked into one’s own facticity and narrow 
limitations.24 One can think of an individual who is locked in their social constructs to the 
point that one lacks the courage to imagine a substantially different life outside of these 
                                                          
 
23 Glenn, D. John Jr. "The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard's Work." In 
Internation Kierkegaard Commentary: Sickness Unto Death, by Robert L. Perkins, 5-23. Macon, Georgia: 
Mercer University Press, 1987. 
24
 Glenn understands the finitude of the self to be not so much its bodily and physical character, 
but rather its involvement in actual situations, and in particular the situations in which one is “absorbed to 
restrictive social roles” (Glenn 1987). 
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narrow constructs. Again, consider Maria who never imaginatively conceives of a 
different socio-economic situation for herself and thus is locked into her currnt situation 
with no hope of escape. This also can be a source of despair for Maria because she has 
now confined herself into a prison of “narrowness…by being finitized, by instead of 
being a self, having become a cipher, one more person, one more repetition of this 
perpetual Einerlei [one-and-the-same]” (SUD, 63). Anti-Climacus would say that 
Maria’s, self-imposed despair of finitude leads to the loss of one’s self within the herd of 
“others.” 
But while one kind of despair steers blindly in theinfinite and loses itself, another kind of despair 
allows itself to be, so to speak, cheated of its self by ‘the others’. By seeing the multitude of 
people around it, by being busied with all sorts of w rldly affairs, by being wise to the ways of the 
world, such a person forgets himself, in a divine sense forgets his own name, dares not to believe 
in himself, finds being himself too risky, finds it much easier and safer to be like the others, to 
become a copy, a number, along with the crowd (SUD, 63-64). 
What is demanded is a right relation between these two poles whereby the self exists as a 
concretion of its own facticity and its own possibilities. For Anti-Climacus, the self a  a 
synthesis of the infinitude and the finitude is the ability to transcend one’s finite 
situations by imagining new situations whereby one chooses to actualize these new 
situations, or as Hannay remarks, “For despair to disappear, imagination must be applied 
to something specific, or from the other side, everyday occupation must become the 
workplace of the imagination” (Hannay 1989). 
The temporal-eternal contrast makes up the longest part of the section on, ‘The 
forms of this sickness’ and is the most vague of the synthesis relationships. For Anti-
Climacus, there is something in the self that is eternal and “transcends” the temporal 
order of our existence. What is this eternal item that resides in the self? Anti-Climacus is 
not clear on the matter, but some speculate that by the ‘eternal factor’ Kierkegaa d is 
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merely getting at “a fundamental goal of human endeavor,” and in particular, the 
“fundamental goal” to become a self (Hannay 1989).  That is, because each person is 
located in the web of cause and effect (time) one must lift themselves out of this system 
of cause and effect and use his or her freedom to actualize the possibilities presented to 
one’s self. However, all this requires that one be motivated to transcend one’s facticity in 
the first place. This motivation, for Hannay, is what Kierkegaard probably means by the 
eternal factor. John Glenn suggests that this synthesis refers to the conflict of the self to 
maintain unity through time while struggling with the tendency for the self’s xistence to 
be dispersed and scattered through different moments, in which case, the self undertakes 
the duty of struggling to give itself a unified (eternal) meaning that transcends 
momentary (the temporal) dispersion of time (Glenn 1987). I would suggest that the 
temporal-eternal synthesis is akin to Kant’s problem of infusing our existence with 
meaning. That is, on one hand we are rooted in the temporal order of the natural world 
and the deterministic laws of science, yet on the other hand we can have fundamental 
meaning by governing ourselves by moral law as practical reason. That is, our existence 
is marked by a struggle to be not only citizens of the natural world of cause and effect, 
but citizens of the moral domain, a la Kant, and the ethico-religious domain, a la 
Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, there is an aspect of human beings that cannot be captur d 
by the deterministic laws of physics, and to think of ourselves as merely automatons 
along with planes, trains, and automobiles is a categorical mistake. It must be 
remembered that Kierkegaard, as I shall discuss shortly, was no enemy of the sciences, 
even though he remained skeptical of the sciences’ task to capture human existence by 
explicating human existence as merely natural phenomena.  
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The possibility-necessity synthesis refers to the self’s struggle with her current 
situation. Of course, Anti-Climacus would insist that our current situation be viewed from 
a religious perspective, and in particular, a Christian perspective via categories of sin, 
redemption, and salvation. For Anti-Climacus, we find ourselves in despair and in order 
to overcome our despair we are need of divine assistance. However, as with the infinite-
finite aspects of the self, I see no reason why one cannot discuss the possibility-necessity 
tension from a socio-political situation and not merely a spiritual situation. In this respect, 
the necessity aspect of the self doesn’t refer to logical nor causal necessity, for 
Kierkegaard, it refers to the self’s limitations. That is, the self is limited by the actual 
situations, including but not limited to social and political limitations, in which the self 
finds itself.  
A contemporary example might be an individual who finds him or herself in a 
situation where they lack power due to their socio-economical status. In the form r sense 
of limitation, there is a certain degree of necessity that the self experinc s; one is limited 
by their socio-economical status and thus is obligated to fulfill certain social r les. On the 
other hand, the possibility of the self refers to both active and passive possibilitie (Glenn 
1987). Active possibility designates what the individual can do given her actual situation, 
while passive possibility indicates what can be done to the individual in her situation. 
Both forms of possibility are initiated by the imagination by which the individual 
assesses her current situation and then considers what viable possibilities one may 
pursue. Again, the point is that one begins in her actual situation, and then moves to 
change the actual by reflecting upon the various possibilities.  Consider the individual 
who is disempowered by their socio-economic status but in and through active possibility 
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decides to take certain actions in order to change their situation. Moreover, the 
individual’s situation can also be changed by passive possibility in that certain things ca  
be done to the individual by outside forces thereby moving the individual to act upon 
these situations. John Glenn notes that, Kierkegaard illuminates the possibility aspect of 
the self by speaking about attitudes of fear, hope, and anxiety in relation to the self and 
possibility. In sum, this first dimension of the self reveals an irresolute self, a self that is 
buffeted between the infinite and the finitude, the eternality and temporality, and the 
possibility and necessity of its own nature.  
The Resolute Self 
The second dimension of the self is the resolute self which is defined as a relation 
that relates itself to itself. Again, this dimension of the self, Anti-Climacus illuminates in 
and through a certain component of despair, the relation itself is the synthesis discussed 
above, and usually appears in some form of imbalance. What’s more is that this 
dimension of the self is progressively conscious of its being an imbalance; thus, the self is 
its consciousness of itself. That is, the resolute self takes a certain posture t wards itself. 
However, what is self-consciousness for Anti-Climacus? John Glenn understands Anti-
Climacus’ notion of the self as self-relating as primarily the reflective activities of the self 
in its volitional aspect as opposed to just the cognitive and introspective aspects of the 
self. That is, the self as self-relating refers primary to the will of the individual, which 
Anti-Climacus casts as various weaknesses of the will. Glenn turns his attention to the 
second major section in SUD entitled, Despair as Defined by Consciousness, to gain an 
understanding of the self defined as self-relating as an aspect of volition. In this section, 
there are two forms of despair that hinder the individual from becoming a self. First, 
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“despair in weakness” the self refuses to be a self because of some factor (in the past, 
present, or mere possibility) which it finds unacceptable. Second, “despair to will t  be 
one’s self in defiance” the self refuses to be a self because it fails to ackn wledge any 
authority over itself. Glenn points out that both forms of despair, for Anti-Climacus, is to 
expose the insufficiency of the unaided self-relation in the attempt to be a self without 
divine assistance. Glenn interprets a similar scenario in Volume Two of the 
pseudonymous work, Either/Or in which Judge William (the Kantian ethicist and author 
of this second volume) reveals that ultimately the ethical stage of existence is incomplete 
and therefore demands a “higher” stage of existence .25 Although the aesthetic stage 
primarily consists in one attempting to satisfy and cultivate one’s desires and impulses, 
which eventually ends in despair; it is absorbed into the ethical stage of existence. 
However, in the end, the ethical stage of existence also proves to be insufficient for 
authentic selfhood. The heart of the ethical stage of existence is the ethicist’s project of 
becoming a self through resolution, which presupposes a view of the self that is 
essentially self-sufficient. Such a view of the self ignores the dependency of humanity to 
become an authentic self upon the one who established the self-relation in the first place; 
the one who established the self-relation, for Anti-Climacus, is God. This dimension of 
the self will be discussed shortly.   
Similarly, Alastair Hannay understands the self as self-relating as consciousness 
of the self’s synthesis typically in a state of imbalance; thus, it refers to the self being 
conscious of its own imbalance. For Hannay, Kierkegaard’s notion of self-consciousness 
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 A concrete picture of the individual resolutely choosing through self-choice and taking 
responsibility for the development of the self as synthesis is visible in the second part of Either/ Or.  
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doesn’t refer merely to introspection as much as it refers to a moral category. That is, the 
self is conscious of itself in a state of despair because it (the self) has failed to fulfill the 
ideal. Again, the central theme here is a form of despair whereby the individual either 
chooses to live in the despairs of finitude or necessity or lives a double life in which the 
ideal is preserved but at a level where there seems no question of its being related to real 
life (Hannay 1989). The previous understandings of Kierkegaard’s notion of the self 
defined as self-relating certainly picks out a feature of the self that I ink Kierkegaard 
intends, namely that it is aware of itself as a synthesis of contrasting factors. However, 
these accounts of self-consciousness strictly define it (the self) as a movement away from 
the self to a transcendent power.  
To my mind, self-consciousness, for Kierkegaard, is not merely an “awareness” of 
the individual’s inability to hold these contrasting factors together (and thereby 
prompting one to seek divine help), but is also the emergence of resolution in addition to 
the body-soul synthesis. That is, the self is conscious of itself as a unity (of contrasting 
factors) but also conscious of itself under a moral obligation in a process of development. 
That is, the self is conscious of the moral task to integrate itself; thus, striving to become 
resolute. The self as an imbalance of contrasting factors (which no doubt corresponds to 
the aesthetic form of life in Kierkegaard’s literary corpus) is only a possible self in that it 
vacillates between the factual and hyperbolic poles, but the self as self-relating (which 
corresponds to the ethical form of life) is the aspect of the self where it (th  self) becomes 
an actual self in that there is an “awaking” of herself to choose the self she will b . That 
is to say, for Kierkegaard, the aspect of the self as self-relating is more than just an 
introspective awareness of the deficiencies of the self; it is the facet of the self where one 
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becomes aware of her moral obligation to become an authentic self. One takes seriously, 
for the first time in her life, the moral task of the development of the self. This aspect of 
the self is cashed out in Kierkegaard’s writings at the ethical stageof existence; it is the 
place where we capture a glimpse of the individual who becomes aware of her ethical and 
universal obligation to choose one’s self absolutely. This self-conscious aspectof the self 
is certainly linked to introspection, but not as an end in and of itself, but rather is the 
power and will of the individual to shape her life through choice. Furthermore, for 
Kierkegaard, the self as self-relating is where the individual becomes aware of the 
significance of one’s life in that she is the sum of her resolute decisions in actualizing the 
various possibilities she presents to herself.  
The Spiritual-Dependent Self 
The third and final dimension of the self is the spiritual dependent self which is 
defined as, a self as an “Other”-relation. This dimension of the self, for some, is 
paramount to understanding Kierkegaard’s notion of the self.26 A look at the key passage 
in SUD, reads, such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must have established 
itself or have been established by another. What are we to make of such remarks? Is 
Kierkegaard insisting that full authentic selfhood can only emerge in relation to God? In 
what follows, I will argue that such a reading of Kierkegaard is too narrow and is in 
danger of missing essential elements in Kierkegaard’s notion of the self, in particular, (it 
misses) elements that can be applicable to Latino male self-transformation. In arguing the 
                                                          
 
26C. Stephan Evans suggests in, Who is the Other in Sickness Unto Death, that an 
understanding the self, which is self-relating in turn ‘relates to another, the one who established 
the relation’ is essential in order to understand Kierkegaard’s notion of the self. 
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latter, it will become evident that Kierkegaard’s notion of the self is not “radically 
individualistic,” but instead is relational in that it incorporates an “other” into the 
emergence of full-selfhood. Although this “other” has traditionally been regard d by 
many Kierkegaardian scholars as strictly God, I will show that this need not bethe case. 
However, even if the “other” is God, I will argue that there is utility in exploring the 
ideas of dependency and vulnerability embedded in Kierkegaard’s “other” defined as 
God for theists and non-theists alike. It is the latter notions of dependence and 
vulnerability that will be picked up in chapter three regarding my discussion on Latino 
male self-transformation. 
First, notice that Kierkegaard incorporates a very Hegelian theme into his account 
of the self, namely the relationship by which the self becomes itself in relation to the 
“other.” Against the idea that Kierkegaard’s notion of the self is radically individualistic 
and extremely self-centered, he does indeed bring an outside factor into the equation. For 
those who chide Kierkegaard for extreme individualism, Evans suggests that the human 
self defined in SUD as “a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself 
relates to another” rules out any account of the self as strictly autonomous and self-
contained (C. S. Evans 1997). In this sense, the ontological structure of the self is 
certainly not individualistic but instead relational: X is a self just in case there is some Y 
external to X and X is in relation to Y. It is important to note that for Kierkegaard the 
“other” has to be another individual. In other words, what Kierkegaard is doing with this 
Hegelian move (with an anti-Hegelian twist) is basically this: self-consciousness cannot 
be separated from the other-consciousness, in which the “other” is defined an individual.  
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That is to say, my self-awareness presupposes my awareness of the other as self-
awareness of another individual. 
At this point one might object by noting that Kierkegaard’s Hegelian move 
regarding the self and the “other” is a façade because Hegel’s “other” was “other” 
community consciousness whereas Kierkegaard’s “other” is merely God. Well, even if it 
is the case that Kierkegaard’s “other” is strictly God, which I will argue momentarily, 
need not be the case, why would God not count as a legitimate “other”?   
Second, suppose that this “other” to which “the self that relates to itself” is indeed 
God, what does this exactly entail? Consider the selected proof texts from part one of 
SUD below: 
Such a relation, which relates to itself, a self, must either have established itself or been 
established by something else (SUD 43). 
If the relation which relates to itself has been established by something else, then of course the 
relation is the third term, but then this relation, the third term, is a relation which relates in turn to 
that which has established the whole relation (SUD 43).
For this latter formula is the expression of the relation’s (the self’s) total dependence, the 
expression of the fact that the self cannot by itself arrive at or remain in equilibrium and rest, but 
only, in relating to itself, by relating to that whic  has established the whole relation (SUD 44).  
This then is the formula which describes the state of he self when despair is completely 
eradicated: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the 
power that established it (SUD 44). 
As the texts above suggest, a third factor is essential for the full or complete dev lopment 
of the “healthy” self except that this third factor resides outside the self. However, many 
Kierkegaardian scholars regard this third factor as none other than God. For exampl , 
Westphal regards the “other” as God in Kierkegaard’s polemical scheme against Hegel. 
Westphal notes, Kierkegaard is not merely repeating Hegel’s notion of the self in terms 
of “other” consciousness, but rather is giving Hegel’s relational self a unique un-Hegelian 
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twist. 27 In order to see this Hegelian subversion, think of the Cartesian self that leaves us 
with epistemic gap between the private and public domains. Against this Cartesian s lf, 
the Hegelian self is essential produced by the public domain (the other). However, th  
Hegelian self reduces subjectivity to social activity; consequently, subjectivity and 
inwardness of faith disappear. Kierkegaard’s task then is to carve out a space for the self 
that avoids Cartesian solipsism and Hegel’s self that becomes indistinguishable from the 
universal and public community. The issue then becomes whether Kierkegaard can 
provide a private space for the self that stands apart from both Cartesian privacy and 
Hegel’s public domain. For Westphal, Kierkegaard does indeed achieve this place where 
the self can act in and through identifying the “other” whom the self relates to as G d.28 
For Kierkegaard, the health of the self then depends on relating properly to God who is 
                                                          
 
27Merold Wesphal in, Kierkegaard’s Psychology and Unconscious Despair, sheds light on 
Kierkegaard’s notion of the self by examining what Kierkegaard means by psychology. Kierkegaard’s 
notion of the self, as it appears in SUD, is part of his, what we might call, clinical psychology. Kierk gaard 
believes that he is diagnosing an illness (i.e. despair) inflicting humanity and then providing a remedy for 
the illness. That is, he sees humanity as patients n need of cure of a disease thwarting the person from
being an authentic self. However, as we shall see, th  remedy resides within the will of every person. 
Westphal observes that, Kierkegaard’s psychology contains both Aristotelian and Cartesian elements. It i  
Aristotelian in that health or the lack of heath is not something that is left to mere feeling, fortune, and fate, 
but rather is something that we do; remedy involves action, will, and responsibility. It is Cartesian with 
respect to the inwardness of the self. In SUD, because the self is defined as “a relation that relates its lf to 
itself,” Westphal points out that the self is relational. As we have already encountered, this relation is the 
result of synthesizing two opposing factors. Yet, Westphal notes that this is not enough for selfhood. It is 
only when this relation relates itself to itself tha  the self as spirit (genuine selfhood) comes to fruition. 
What Kierkegaard obviously has in mind with self-relation is self-consciousness and seems very similar to 
the inwardness of Descartes’ cogito. However, as Wesphal points out, it is not just Cartesian inwardness, it 
is the self’s relation to itself which is its freedom.  
 
28Westphal understands Kierkegaard’s grounding the self in God as polemical move against Hegel 
grounding the self in the social order. Kierkegaard un erstands Hegel’s social order of the self’s ground. In 
this scenario one’s fellow humans become the principal other to whom one relates, and a right relation to 
this other that has established the self constitutes th  self’s health. Consequently, Westphal notes th  
individual seeks to be like others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man, and forgets himself. Instead of 
the individual person being lumped together with aggre ate and thereby losing their self, the individual self 
can by preserved only by his/her self- awareness of existing before God. 
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the self’s ground (Westphal 1987). By making the “other” God, as Westphal notes, 
Kierkegaard is able to polemically challenge the idea that the absolute is synonymous 
with the prevailing ideas of society. In this way, Kierkegaard includes himelf in the 
company of social critics such as Socrates who stood against the established “trut s” and 
the superficiality of their day.  
However, one might inquire as to why the self has to be defined as a God-relation 
in the first place. For Kierkegaard, does the “other” that stands in relation to the self have 
to be God? That is, although the “other” for Kierkegaard has typically been define , and 
with good reason, as God, Evans cautions against hasty conclusions that narrowly 
understand this third element as exclusively God.29 God is not the only “other” by which 
human selves can relate in order to become authentic selves. I’m persuaded that there is 
good internal evidence to support the latter point. Part one of SUD supports the 
interpretation that the “other” Kierkegaard has in mind is someone or something other 
than God. Anti-Climacus, for example, suggests there are levels or gradations of 
consciousness and self-awareness in relation to another. With Evans I concur that for 
Kierkegaard, although the highest level of self-awareness and thus authentic selfhood is 
one’s relation to God, this doesn’t exclude a level of authentic selfhood in relation to 
other people. If this is correct then the relational structure of the ontological self is 
actualized in and through relating not only to God, but other people too. Anti-Climacus 
writes: 
The progression in consciousness we have been concerned with up to now occurs within the 
category of the human self, or of the self that has m n as its standard of measurement. But this self 
                                                          
 
29 Pojman in, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, understands this 
“other” Kierkegaard refers to as exclusively God, p. 13-16. 
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takes on a new quality and specification in being the self that is directly before God. This self is no 
longer the merely human self but what, hoping not to be misinterpreted; I would call the 
theological self, the self directly before God. And what an infinite reality this self acquires by 
being conscious of being before God, by being a human self that has God as its standard! A 
herdsman who (if this is possible) is a self directly before cattle a very low self; similarly a master 
who is a self directly before slaves, indeed really he is not a self-for in both cases there is no 
standard of measurement. The child, who up to then has had only its parents’ standard, becomes a 
self through acquiring, as an adult, the State as it standard. But what an infinite accent is laid upon 
the self when it acquires God as its standard! (SUD, 111). 
For Anti-Climacus, depending on the “other” that one relates to, determines the degree of 
self that one comes away with. If the “other” which one relates to is an animal or 
inanimate objects, then one’s sense of self or self-awareness is at a low degree of 
selfhood. Moreover, the self-identity that one comes away with in relation to the “other”- 
(defined exclusively as another individual) is then worked out via the self’s ethical task of 
becoming. That is to say, the life projects that one assigns to his or herself (or to use 
Kierkegaard’s language, the self’s task of becoming) become healthy and authentic or 
unhealthy and unauthentic depending on the “other individual” that one stands in relation 
to. A contemporary example shows what Anti-Climacus has in mind here. Consider the 
Latino male who emulates (stands in relation to) other Latino males. Depending upon 
how much of a “self” the other is, is how much of a “self” one comes away with. If the
“other” whom the Latino male emulates is an unhealthy self (a minimal self), th n we can 
also expect the Latino male will also be an unhealthy self (minimal self). The latter points 
would be missed if Kierkegaard’s “other” is defined as exclusively God. We need ot and 
cannot identify Kierkegaard’s “other” as exclusively God for danger of missing essential 
dimensions in Kierkegaard notion of the self.   
 Finally, by cashing out this “other” as God, Kierkegaard reveals aspects of human 
vulnerability, dependency, and limitedness by exposing the inability of humanity to 
restore herself to proper health by her own means. For Kierkegaard, God functions as the 
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Creator who has established the self (ontologically the self is created as a relation being), 
but then allows the self to be co-creators, if you will, in the ethical task to choose the elf 
we will become. Intricately bound up with the idea of the “other” as God is the idea that 
humanity, in order to have healing from the disease of despair, must come to terms with 
the diagnoses and ultimately become vulnerable and dependent by receiving the a tidot  
of faith. This is made explicit by Anti-Climacus as he discusses two conscious forms of 
despair:  1) “Not to will to be oneself, to will to do away with oneself” and 2) “in despair 
to will to be oneself” (SUD, 72-80).  
 Consider the first form of despair; despair due to weakness of the will. Subjects in 
the latter form of despair are not willing to take upon themselves the project of becoming 
a self because they don’t will to be their self. For example, there are people who have an 
unhealthy view of themselves and refuse to be the person that they are. In extreme cas s, 
some may feel so overwhelmed with the task to be themselves, they may want to get rid 
of themselves altogether, echoing sentiments such as, “if I were only X, then I would 
amount to something great.” Consider the Latino male who becomes disillusioned with 
his life and life-projects only because he is not of a certain race, ethnicity, or well-
positioned in a certain socio-economic class. Kierkegaard would refer to the latter as a 
case of despair due to weakness of the will. 
 The second form of conscious despair, for Anti-Climacus, is the despair to will t
be one’s self in defiance. Again, concrete forms of this particular despair are not hard to 
imagine. Consider the Latino male who constructs a fragmented self which is not only 
dangerous to himself but to others around him. He rejects any notion of being dependent 
and vulnerable upon an “other” except himself; he refuses in defiance to be a “healthy 
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and complete self”; he says, “You’re not the boss of me!” Or, “I can’t trust anybody 
except myself!” These anecdotes reveal forms of despair that result from he rejection of 
dependency and vulnerability upon the “other.” Thus, the Latino male in this form of 
despair fails to be an authentic self because in defiance he refuses to make himself 
dependent and vulnerable to “others” around himself.  
In sum, by casting the “other” as God, Anti-Climacus is able to critique Hegel’s 
notion of the self and bring out aspects of human vulnerability and humility in relation to 
constructing healthy and complete selves.   
Conclusion 
My conclusion is that Kierkegaard’s self represents a hybrid notion between th  
metaphysical and relational achievement self. The ontological self, for Kierkegaard, is a 
synthesis of opposing factors that must be tempered just right in order to avoid 
imbalance. However, these opposing factors make up the parameters wherein the 
individual is called to engage in the highest human project: to become a self. This project 
of authentic selfhood is dynamic and relational; it requires the individual to create and 
construct themselves. Although it is a struggle, holding the contrasting factors together 
requires self-awareness. However, self-awareness requires the conscious ess of another 
individual, but this “other” individual doesn’t necessarily have to be God. In agreement 
with Evans, I interpret Kierkegaard as insisting on various gradations and levels of 
selfhood, which for Kierkegaard the highest level of selfhood is a God-relation; 
nevertheless, a God-relation isn’t required for a minimal level of selfhood.  
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Furthermore, I’m convinced that Kierkegaard’s attempt to define the self, a  both 
a metaphysical and achievement project is crucial today in a time whereindividual and 
personal identity has been called into question in very significant manner.30 Although I 
don’t deny the importance of the self being defined in and through achievement and 
relation, I also maintain the importance of an ontological self as ground for the relational 
achievement self.   
There are a number of insights in Kierkegaard’s hybrid notion of the self that can 
inform contemporary Latino male self-transformation. First, constructing one’s self can 
be understood as a moral project in which the individual takes as his or her vocation to 
become an authentic self.31 In terms of contemporary Latino/a issues such as Latino male 
self-transformation, self-transformation may be approached with a mor l obligation. 
Second, this moral project and vocation to become a self is not (and cannot) be achieved 
in isolation, but rather depends upon “standing” in relation to healthy “others.” In other 
words, self-transformation requires the help of the others; it is a task for the individual 
and the community. Third, the moral project to become a self is not devoid of any 
metaphysics; instead it presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions and parameters. 
That is, Kierkegaard’s hybrid metaphysical account of the self avoids anti-essentialist 
critiques because even though the task of the individual to “self-create” resides within 
metaphysical perimeters, self-creation within these metaphysical perimeters (the self as 
                                                          
 
 
30Identity has been come under attack in a number of venues such as philosophical attacks on the 
notion of the self and identity, as well political attacks which denies that any notion of ethnic identity is 
useful and productive to a healthy democracy.  
 
31Of course for Kierkegaard constructing the self would certainly go beyond moral obligation and 
would quickly become a religious duty. 
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triadic being) doesn’t necessarily absolve the individual from the task to self-create. 
Fourth, Kierkegaard’s self (the vocation to become a self) is a task that begins in one’s 
current situation whether that is one’s socio-economic and political situation or one’s 
spiritual situation or both. 
Finally, there is utility in Kierkegaard’s notion of the self in relation to God in that 
it brings to light the crucial matter of a standard and criteria by which one uses to gain a 
self. This will have vital consequences in discussing Latino males and “healthy” role 
models by which to acquire healthy and complete selves. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s 
remarks on “religious self” is also helpful in “whole self” formation by bringing to the 
discussion vulnerability, dependency, and humility by relating to a higher power, even if 













Chapter II- Kierkegaard’s Subjectivity 
Introduction to Subjectivity
Kierkegaard attends to subjectivity throughout his entire pseudonymous 
authorship, but never more rigorously than under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. 32The Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, written in 1846, is the sequel to the Philosophical Fragments 
written two years earlier; however, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (hereafter CUP) is 
five times longer than the Fragments which Climacus calls a, “pamphlet”. These two 
works are associated not only by their subject matter and authorship, but also by their
humorious titles. Philosophiske Smuler: eller en Smule Philosophi translated as, Just a 
crumb of philosophy or philosophical crumbs which is misleadingly translated in English 
as, Philosophical Fragments (Hannay 2001). To present any literary work, especially a 
philosophical work, as merely a crumb or a morsel of philosophy would have been 
humorous to some and to others would have been outright scandalous because in that day 
philosophy was considered an all-encompassing tight knit scientific system. Equally 
comical was the reference “unscientific” in the title of the Postscript. Hegel’s philosophy, 
                                                          
 
32 Right at the start subjectivity must be distinguished from subjectivism. That is, Kierkegaard’s 
subjectivity does not denote personal relativism such that the individual maneuvers through life by personal 
whim, nor does it refer to a type of ethical subjectivism whereby one creates her own ethics according to 
her own preferences. As I proceed it will become clear why Kierkegaard’s subjectivity cannot amount to 




dominating the philosophical landscape in Kierkegaard’s day, was described as a system;
therefore, it elevated speculative philosophy to the prestigious platform and respectful 
standing as that of science (C. S. Evans 1983).  Clearly, as both titles indicate, Climacus 
has set his target on the speculative right-wing Hegelian system that had gripped Demark 
in Kierkegaard’s day.33  
                                                          
 
33Climacus had especially set out to combat Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884) theologian, 
professor at the University of Copenhagen, who later became Bishop of Zealand. Martensen’s most 
important contribution to speculative theology was, Christian Dogmatics. Moreover, Climacus sought to 
attack Hegel’s philosophical system. It was Hegel’s notoriously opaque and difficult philosophical 
assessment of religion in general and Christianity i  particular that didn’t sit very well with Climacus. For 
Hegel, propositional truth can’t simply be presented in an either true or false manner. Truth is more 
complex Hegel believed, because propositional truths express both truth and falsehood. Suppose that one 
utters a proposition; it is inevitable that this pro osition is only partially true and expresses a one-sided 
truth. What is needed for the whole truth is the proposition’s opposite, and out of the clash of these 
opposing views a more adequate statement of the truth will emerge. Again, this dialectical process is 
repeated; as a result, this “seemly” more adequate st ment of the truth inevitably finds itself parti l and 
one-sided. The opposite view is again summoned to produce a more adequate statement of the truth and so 
forth. The point here is that going through this dialectical process, a more adequate statement of truth both 
cancels and affirms the opposing statements. For Hegel, absolute truth emerges via the process of 
philosophical thinking through his whole system.  
The whole is only complete when two propositions are made together, and when the first is 
asserted and maintained, it must be countered by clinging to the other with invincible 
stubbornness. Since both are equally right, they ar both equally wrong, and the mistake consists 
in taking such abstract forms as ‘the same’ and ‘not the same’, ‘identity’ and ‘non-identity’, to be 
something true, fixed, and actual, and in resting o them. Neither the one nor the other has truth; 
the truth is just their movement in which simple sameness is an abstraction and hence absolute 
difference…(PS p.472-473). 
Consequently, for Hegel, Christianity was but a partial truth and needed to be superseded in the process of 
the entire speculative system. According to this scheme, Christianity is one stage in the total process that 
constitutes the truth; the speculative must seek a more adequate expression of the truth.  In the end, 
Climacus interpreted Hegel as demoting faith as simply a given, and something that we needed to get 
beyond. Merold Westphal comments on Hegel’s treatmen  of Christian faith as something incomplete and 
perhaps “child-like,” which necessitated moving past the Christian faith altogether.   
All the focus of chapter 7 of the Phenomenology is on getting from the “imperfect,” “incomplete,” 
and “defective” form (Vorstellungen), to the truly spiritual and perfected form (Begriffe)…faith is 






As we shall see, what Kierkegaard does with subjectivity is widely read as merely 
a project of radical individual subjectivity such that the highest call for the individual s 
to retreat and turn his back on society while contemplating his or her personal piety lone 
with God. However, I will argue that this reading is wrong. I will argue that subjectivity 
for Kierkegaard is not an end in and of itself, but rather a radical attempt, as a social 
critic, to call attention to a society that has deified itself at the expense of the individual. 
In other words, subjectivity is a tool in the hands of the Danish gadfly trying to dislodge 
and expose a religiously veiled social ideology.  
Kierkegaard’s Conception of Subjectivity 
Climacus seeks to correct the spiritual and religious Danish culture by correcting 
a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to exist as a human being. Such a task, 
Climacus thinks, requires an analysis of subjectivity. Thus, the context of discussing 
subjectivity is tied to context of correcting one’s thinking about existence.34 In this way, 
                                                          
 
34 CUP, then, is written to sort out the issue of what it means to be a Christian in the face of 
Danish Hegelian Christians in the 1840’s. That is, Climacus is asking, “How does one become a 
Christian?” Whatever the answer to this question tur s out to be for Climacus, one thing is assured; 
Christianity will not be examined in the traditional objective manner. Climacus writes, “In order, however, 
to avoid confusion, it should immediately be borne in mind that the issue is not about the truth of 
Christianity but about the individual’s relation to Christianity, consequently not about the indifferent 
individual’s systematic eagerness to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs but rather about the 
concern of the infinitely interested individual with regard to his own relation to such a doctrine…the 
objective issue, then would be about the truth of Christianity. The subjective issue is about the individual’s 
relationship to Christianity” (Post. VII 6-8). The problem that Climacus diagnoses is that the Denmark 
Hegelians, and many orthodox guardians of Christianity, have transformed Christianity into a scholarly and 
intellectual exercise. The error lies in thinking that becoming a Christian is a result of completing a learned 
process because the achievement of such a process (both as philosophical speculation and historical 
inquiry) is never complete. Becoming a Christian involves faith, and faith involves a decision; however, 
attempting to relate to Christianity in an objective manner negates making a decision since making an 
objective decision requires postponing decision until the final result are in. Moreover, it is equally wrong-
headed, Climacus is convinced, to think that one is automatically a Christian simply because one is born 
into a certain family, clan, social class, and/or geo raphical location. The error in this particular thinking is 
that one is by default a Christian simply by birth so there is no urgency and no sense in contemplating what 




Climacus wants to change his contemporaries’ thinking about the way they think about 
ethics and religion via a change in their thinking regarding existence itself. Th  point of 
departure for discussing existence, for Climacus, is a discussion of subjectivity. The four 
main aspects of subjectivity that I will explicate are: I) objective and subjective thinking, 
II) subjectivity and indirect communication, III) subjectivity as inwardness, xistence, 
and passion, and IV) subjectivity and truth. Upon discussing these aspects of subjectivity, 
I will conclude by highlighting some important themes that will be taken up and used in 
my discussion on Latino male self-transformation in the next chapter. 
I)  Objective and Subjective Thinking 
The type of thinking that Climacus thinks is essential to authentic human 
existence is subjective thinking in contrast to objective thinking. For Kierkegaard, human 
thought can take different postures or standpoints on different matters. For exampl, we 
can reflect differently by offering a variety of views on a plethora of issue . 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship does just this; it presents diverse views 
concerning matters of existence, inwardness, guilt, sin, reason, faith, passion, e thetics, 
ethics, and the religious. Although there are many cognitive standpoints that one may 
take, for Kierkegaard, there are two essential employments of human thought concerning 
the many standpoints that we do take: objective thought and subjective thought.  We can 
reflect on many issues either in an objective or subjective manner. Kierkegaard writes in 
Postscript concerning this distinction:   
Whereas objective thinking is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective 
thinker as existing is essentially interested in his own thinking, is existing in it. Therefore, his 




thinking has another kind of reflection, specially, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby it 
belongs to the subject and to no one else (Post. VII 55). 
One could see this distinction Kierkegaard is making by considering the type of thinking 
utilized when the Latino male is “thinking” about logical and scientific problems versus 
the type of thinking employed when he thinks about his own existence and more 
specifically what it means to be a whole and authentic Latino male. 
 It is important to note that Kierkegaard is not just making a distinction between 
abstract thought and concrete thought. It is not that theoretical or objective thinking 
attempts to understand the world abstractly whereas subjective thinking attempts o 
understand the world in concrete terms.  Both theoretical or objective and subjective 
thinking make abstractions. Theoretical thinking understands the world abstractly by 
using objective terms, and subjective thought understands the world abstractly in relation 
to his or her own existence (C. S. Evans 1982). The issue that Kierkegaard, via Climacus 
in CUP, is illuminating is that the mind can take a certain posture towards objects. Tha  
is, we can take an objective standpoint towards objects that are legitimate such as the 
empirical sciences and logic. However, we are not only epistemologically compelled but 
morally obligated to approach ethics and religion via subjective reflection. Edward J. 
Hughes makes these remarks regarding Kierkegaard’s objective/ subjective distinction. 
Objectivity does not stand alone apart from subjectivity or refer to something existing in itself. 
Objectivity in this scheme is primarily the choice of a subject to orient oneself both toward the 
world and toward oneself in a particular manner. Objectivity is a freely chosen stance, an activity 
that moves away from concern with the subject and moves toward the object as its locus. The 
subject in order to be faithful to an objective stance must withdraw or abstract away from his or 
her existence in order to reflect the object of thought (Hughes 1995). 
For Kierkegaard, there are certain problems that can only be approached in a subjective 
manner, that is, in relation to one’s own existence. It is the latter approach that must not 
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be surrendered to the empirical sciences because “when man is studied by means of this 
objective reflection, he is treated in terms of the same laws, traits, and determining 
conditions that prevail in the rest of nature.”35 It is not that Kierkegaard despises 
objectivity and the sciences, but rather objectivity is limited because it moves away from 
the personal and ethical dimensions of human existence.  
Instead of having the task of understanding the concrete abstractly, as abstract thinking has, the 
subjective thinker has the opposite task of understanding the abstract concretely. Abstract thinking 
turns from concrete human beings to human-kind in ge eral; the subjective thinker understands 
the abstract concept to be the concrete human being, to be this individual existing human being 
(Post VII 305). 
Kierkegaard believes that there are certain problems (existential problems) facing each 
individual that can only be solved when the person deliberately orients the mind in 
relation to his or her own existence, and he worries that emersion in objectivity can be an 
instrument used for the subject to escape the obligation of ethical and religious matter  
pertaining to his own existence.  
No, praised be scholarship, praised be everyone who chases the cattle away from its sanctuary. 
The ethical is and remains the highest task assigned to very human being. It may also be required 
of a devotee of scholarship that he understand ethically before he dedicates himself to his 
intellectual discipline, that he continue to understand himself ethically in all his labor...(Post VII 
125). 
For Kierkegaard, although objective reflection can give us at best only 
approximate knowledge, his primary concern is what the objective standpoint requires of 
the individual.36  Climacus describes the knowing subject in an objective mode of inquiry 
                                                          
 
35 James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1983) p.46. 
36 Climacus argues that the greatest certainty that objective knowledge (sense certainty, historical 
knowledge, and speculative knowledge) can give us is only an approximation; thus requiring at some point 
on the part of the individual a leap (PF 83-84; CUP 21-38; 44, 218, 314, 316). For more on Kierkegaard’s 
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as disinterested and neutral, but in doing so the subject becomes indifferent to her own 
existence and devoid of inwardness and passion.37 It is precisely the latter state of affairs 
that must be avoided when approaching the ethic-religious domain (21).  In sum, 
Kierkegaard writes that objectivity and the sciences have their proper domain, but there 
are limits to this domain, and issues of ethics and religion (existential matters) fall outside 
this domain, and are instead properly discussed in the domain of subjectivity.38   
II)  Subjectivity and Indirect Communication 
In CUP, Climacus deals with indirect communication in a chapter entitled, 
Something about Lessing.39 In that chapter Climacus develops four theses related to 
Lessing; however, I will only be exploring the first thesis because it concerns subjectivity 
and indirect communication.   
The first thesis attributed to Lessing, The subjective existing thinker is aware of 
the dialectic of communication, introduces the distinction between direct and indirect 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Humean skepticism see Richard H. Popkin, “Hume and Kierkegaard” The Journal of Religion, Vol.31, No. 




37Although Climacus believes that objectivity requires detachment and disinterestedness on the 
part of the subject, he also believes that this “neutrality” is rarely achieved (CUP 43). 
 
38 For a discussion on Kierkegaard’s objective/ subjectiv  distinction see Sylvia Walsh, 
Subjectivity versus Objectivity: Kierkegaard’s Postscript and Feminist Epistemology, International 
Kierkegaard Commentary Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments (Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1997, 11-22. Walsh rgues that although Climacus accepts traditional 
androcentric epistemological orientation, Climacan subjectivity can still play an emancipatory role in 
feminist studies. 
 
39 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) was a famous dramatist, critic, and central figure in the 
German Enlightenment. Kierkegaard praises Lessing in Concluding Unscientific Postscript for what he 
says about historical and eternal truth in his essay, On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power. In this essay, 
Lessing makes the distinction between necessary truths that cannot be otherwise and contingent or 
historical truths that can be otherwise. In CUP, Lessing is admired primarily for his emphasis on the 




communication, which correlates to objective and subjective thinking (VII 55).40 For 
Climacus, direct communication goes hand-in-hand with objective thinking. As we have 
seen, objective thought is different from subjective thought and the former is 
communicated differently than the latter. Objective thinking is indifferent to the thinking 
subject and his or her own existence whereas the subjective thinker is, “essentially 
interested in his own thinking, is existing in it…his thinking has another kind of 
reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby it belongs to the 
subject and no one else” (73). What Climacus has in mind here is that objective thought 
is concerned with existence only in so far as it is concerned with human existence as part 
of its natural existence. That is, human beings are a part of nature and just as other
creatures of the natural order we are endowed with actualities and possibilitie . Objective 
thought operates in this domain via thought directed toward objects and thus can be 
communicated directly as a “result”. However, we can also, different from other creatures 
of the natural world, not only think about our actualities and possibilities, but we can step 
back and reflect upon our possibilities and think about what possibilities we ought to 
actualize and appropriate to our lives. For Climacus, that latter type of thinking is 
subjective thinking in that we are thinking about what possibilities we ought to actualize, 
and especially those possibilities that have a direct bearing on our own existence.  
For Climacus, subjective thinking can only be communicated indirectly. Climacus 
writes these words regarding indirect communication and double-reflection. 
                                                          
 
40Climacus makes it clear that the thesis he (Climacus) attributes to Lessing is not necessarily what 
the historical Lessing actually intended, but instead his (Climacus’) appropriation of Lessing’s remarks, “I 
now intend to present something that I shall, what t e deuce, ascribe to Lessing, without being certain that 
he would acknowledge it” (72).  
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Objective thinking is completely indifferent to subjectivity and thereby to inwardness and 
appropriation; its communication is therefore direct. It is obvious that it does not therefore have to 
be easy. But it is direct; it does not have the illus veness and the art of double-reflection….it can 
be understood directly; it can be reeled off (Post VII 58).  
What Climacus has in mind with double reflection is simply that subjective 
communication is not so much concerned with “understanding” an item intellectually 
outside one’s self, but rather is related to self understanding. Objective thinking is 
communicated directly by passing information from one person to the next person. The 
recipient of such knowledge only needs to grasp the information communicated for it (the 
communication act) to be successful; this is the first and only reflection and thus there is 
no need for a second reflection.  The subjective thinker, however, not only grasps the 
intellectual content (the first reflection), but must also consider how to apply and 
appropriate the content to her own existence (the second reflection). Double reflection, 
then, puts the individual in the awkward place of confronting the self and problems 
related to the self, which may be a lonely and clandestine place. Merold Westphal writes 
these insightful remarks regarding the challenge and loneliness of reflection. 
In immediacy we live our lives thoughtlessly, allowing instinct or habit, inclination or drive, to 
dictate our actions….in reflection, by contrast, we become thoughtful. We disengage from our 
instincts, habits, inclinations, and drives so as to tep back from life and take a look at it. It is 
appropriate that the term “reflection” should make us think of seeing ourselves in a mirror or in a 
calm lake, for in reflection we do indeed manage to look at ourselves (Westphal 1996). 
 The second reflection, for Climacus, is a matter of personal inwardness whereby the 
subjective thinker is left alone with the content communicated and now must wrestle with 
how to personally apply the matter to her own life and her own existence. The second 
reflection, in this sense becomes more than just introspection but rather is a type of 
thinking that demands certain actions of the individual. Consider the Latino male who has 
just finished attending a series of lectures on self-transformation and machismo. At the 
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conclusion of the series of lectures, one might say that his notebook is full in sense that 
notes were taken and concepts were employed by abstracting from the universal to the 
particular. On this surface level, Climacus would no doubt say that communication took 
place (a notebook full of notes bears this out), and one might even be tempted to say that 
communication was “publically” successful. However, Climacus would also insist that 
communication is unfinished and left incomplete until one has properly appropriated 
(second reflection) the content of the lecture to his own existence. The latter type of 
reflection requires on the part of the listener the task of appropriating the lecure content 
to his own personal existence; this task now takes on the form of an ethical duty which 
could never be “taught” directly by a third-party.        
Nevertheless, objectors may simply point out that Climacus’ notion of subjective 
reflection is nothing more than introspective thinking that precedes action, but if this 
criticism is right then how would this differ in any significant sense from objective 
thinking? One way to get Climacus off the hook is to interpret his distinction, as Evans
observes, as a distinction between a type of thinking “subjective thinking” or “existential 
thinking” that is primarily concerned with action and a type of thinking “objectiv  
thought” that is not. In this way, “thought and action are separate because action is never 
equivalent to merely having thought something; they are linked because genuine actio  is 
the realization of what has been thought” (C. S. Evans 1983).  
Climacus is attempting to bring attention to a type of thinking, he calls existential 
thinking, that precedes action and even prompts passionate action toward existential 
problems. However, this still leaves the problem of how subjectivity is to be 
communicated unresolved. Communicating subjectivity from one person to the next takes 
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place via maieutic art and the method of dialectic.41 Just as Socrates communicated to his 
audience indirectly, as a “midwife,” through dialectic in order to get beneath the veneer 
of deception and illusion; his ultimate goal was to get the individual to arrive at the tru  
for himself. The task, then, of communicating subjectivity in an “artful” way requi s that 
the communicator distance himself from the recipient in order for the recipient to grasp 
the truth by himself.42 The communicator can present the existential possibilities to the 
recipient, but in the end it is the responsibility of the recipient to act in freedom and 
appropriate the truth to their own lives.  
Moreover, the communicator engages in a method of dialectic in order to 
communicate indirectly. The notion of dialectic, for Kierkegaard, is not synonymous with 
Hegel in that for the latter, dialectic is conceived as the ongoing and opposing 
movements in the world-historical process, but rather, for Kierkegaard the opposition 
takes the form of taking a critical and questioning posture in order to see all possible 
angles in a situation from which the subject is then asked to choose. 
The task of communicating subjectivity proves to be more difficult than one 
might think because “the recipient is in the grip of various illusions,” and “a person may 
will, consciously or unconsciously, to remain in the illusion” (C. S. Evans 1983). Thus, 
                                                          
 
41Maieutic comes from the Greek word maieuesthai, to midwife or act as a midwife; and the word 
maieutikos meaning, of midwifery. To communicate maieutically means to communicate in such a way 
that one acts as a “midwife” not giving birth, but ra her helping the individual to give birth. The 
communicator doesn’t present doctrines, but instead helps the hearer to recognize the possibilities; putting 
the hearer in a situation, usually a difficult and uncomfortable situation, wherein the hearer must draw 
appropriate conclusions for himself. 
 
42For more on distancing the author and the reader see Merold Westphal’s remarks on 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship and the “death of the author” motif in Roland Barthes, Hans-




the tools employed for such a project of “indirect communication of subjectivity” to an 
audience steeped in illusion, as Climacus believed, fall to irony and humor.43 Although 
explicating the tools of irony and humor are beyond the scope of my current task, one 
may certainly be justified in claiming that Kierkegaard’s entire pseudonymous authorship 
can be seen as an attempt to indirectly communicate artfully and ironically to his 
audience by presenting various views, positions, and most importantly existential 
possibilities whereby the reader is left alone, so to speak, with the possibilitie  in order to 
assume responsibility for actualizing (or not) these possibilities.44 
III)  Subjectivity as Inwardness, Existence, and Passion 
Subjectivity does not denote a single unitary meaning, but rather refers to a 
constellation of interrelated concepts that are not identical, but yet have an overlapping 
set of meanings.45 Subjectivity for Kierkegaard encompasses a certain set of concepts: 
                                                          
 
43Irony, for Kierkegaard, had several meanings. One, irony functioned as an existential transitional 
standpoint between the aesthetic and the ethical domain. Second, irony was a tool used in his encounter 
with others. Humor also had several meaning for Kiekegaard. Like irony, humor was an existential 
transitional standpoint the individual could assume in her movement from the ethical to the religious 
existence sphere. Humor was also a tool employed in order to communicate with others. 
 
44 In some cases, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship is doubly removed from the audience in 
that not only is the act of writing under a pseudonym an employment of indirect communication, but the 
pseudonyms themselves engage in widening space betwen the author and the reader by employing other 
forms of indirect communication. This is evident wih the writings of Johannes Climacus. Climacus 
engages in a type of experimental psychology, “I who am neither a religious speaker nor a religious per on, 
but just a humorous, imaginatively constructing psychologist” (VII, 419). The Swenson translation reads, 
“a humoristic experimenting psychologist” (p. 431). For Kierkegaard, the psychological experimenting is 
not what modern psychology means by the term, but rathe  is simply hypothetical thinking. That is, he 
engages in what we tend to call, thought experiments. He imaginatively constructs various existential 
possibilities, while he himself doesn’t commit to any one possibility, but instead leaves that to the reader to 
decide.     
 
45 I have borrowed the reference to Kierkegaardian subjectivity as a constellation of meaning from 
Edward J. Hughes in “How Subjectivity is Truth in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.” Hughes 
remarks that the terms: spirit, inwardness, subjectivity, passion, interest, and Christianity, “form a 
constellation of meaning for which Kierkegaard reveals both the dynamic of the soul and the subjective 
side of the essence of Christianity” p. 198. Furthermore, regarding the concept of subjectivity, one may see 
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inwardness, existence, and passion. In what follows, I will discuss each of these concepts, 
but first it is necessary to be reminded of how Kierkegaard/Climacus uses the concepts 
interchangeably.  
But primarily I sought through my own reflection to pick up a clue to the ultimate 
misunderstanding. I need not report my many mistake, but it finally became clear to me that the 
deviation of speculative thought and, based thereupon, its presumed right to reduce faith to factor 
might not be something accidental, might be located far eeper in the orientation of the whole age- 
most likely in this, that because of much knowledge people have entirely forgotten what it means 
to exist and what inwardness is (Post 1. 241-2). 
Yes, as said previously, I have nothing to do with the contents of the book. My thesis was that 
subjectivity, inwardness, is truth (Post 1.300). 
The subjective thinker as existing is essentially interested in his own thinking, is existing in it. 
Therefore, his thinking has another kind of reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of 
possession, whereby it belongs to the subject and to o one else (Post 1.73). 
Even in connection with relative pathos, the dialectical is like oil on the fire and extends the range 
of inwardness and intensively inflames the passion…the pathos-filled in our philosophical 
nineteenth century has fallen into discredit and the dialectical has become passionless…because 
passion is the very tension in the contradiction, and when this is taken away the passion is a 
pleasantry, a witty remark. An existence-issue, however, is pathos-filled and dialectical. The one 
set forth here requires existence-inwardness in order to grasp the pathos, passion of thought to 
grasp the dialectical difficultly, and concentrated passion because one is suppose to exist in it 
(Post 1.385-6). 
Then it certainly would be dubious to enter the truth of Christianity in this manner. Christianity is 
spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its 
maximum an infinite, personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness (Post 1.32-33). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this particular concept in terms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” as opposed to 
nice tidy and underlying essences of concepts. Wittgenstein remarks,  
Consider for example the proceedings that we all call, “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?- Don’t say: “There must be 
something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”- but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all.- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to 
all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that…and the result of this 
examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression 
to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances 
between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap 
and criss-cross in the same way (PI 66-67).  
I refer to this passage again later in the paper in chapter three with reference to Kierkegaard’s stages of 




Inwardness and subjectivity are closely related but inwardness seems to pick out a 
narrower domain of subjectivity whereby the individual puts him or herself in a position 
to be left alone, apart from social status, in order to contemplate concerns of an ethic l 
and religious nature.46 This private contemplation is not for its own sake, but to move the 
individual to take action concerning becoming a self and to face the problem of one’s 
own existence.  Again, this facet of inwardness can be made transparent by discussing the 
Latino male who has developed an “unhealthy” estimation of himself and others in the 
                                                          
 
46The meaning of inwardness (Inderlighed), for Kierkegaard, at times seems to be synonymous 
with subjectivity in that he uses the terms interchangeably. Stephen Evans takes “subjectivity” and 
“inwardness” to be synonymous but quickly notes that, “It is of course a daunting task to say what 
“inwardness” is for Kierkegaard” (Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript” The Relig ous Philosophy 
of Johannes Climacus, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press International, Inc, 1983, pp.39-41). 
Nevertheless, Evans suggests that inwardness refersto, “the central enduring concerns that give shape and 
substance to the personality, concerns that have both a dispositional character and an episodic character.” 
Evans goes on to point out that these concerns are not merely “naturally present” in the individual, but 
rather they are “formed” by the individual and aided or hindered by the individual. These concerns are of 
the nature of moral and religious character, and are essential to the task of becoming a true self.  In this 
sense, inwardness is defined in a broad manner dealing with moral and religious concerns and their direct 
bearing on the subject in the task of becoming a true self. However, Robert C. Roberts puts a little space 
between subjectivity and inwardness. For Roberts, subjectivity (Subjekdtivitet) “suggests a contrast with 
interests, attitudes, and compulsions (that is, the character-formation) associated with the activities of 
speculative philosophy and professional historical s holarship” (Existence, emotion, and virtue: Classical 
Themes in Kierkegaard, The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, pp. 177-206).  That is, subjectivity is used by Kierkegaard, broadly speaking, to contrast the 
character formation of the individual committed to the enterprise of “objectivity” as opposed to character 
formation and dispositions of the individual committed to subjectivity.  Inwardness, for Roberts, differs 
from subjectivity in that it “implies a different contrast- with “externalities” such as social position, 
reputation, the “results” of one’s actions, and publicly observed natural phenomena.” Inwardness according 
Roberts as a contrast to “externalities” gets at one’s personal and private self apart from social and public 
trappings. Inwardness, in this sense, seems to be much narrower than subjectivity in that in a state of 
inwardness one is left alone to contemplate, as Kierkegaard would have it, the individual is stripped of the 
comforts of the “externalities” and left to contemplate their own existence. Julia Watkin spells out 
subjectivity in terms of living in a “sphere of personal commitment to an ethical-religious way of life, to the 
living of that life,” while inwardness is defined in much narrower constrains of religiosity, (Historical 
Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy). Inwardness, for Watkin, refers to “spiritual poten iality of the 
human soul experienced from the inside.” Watkin goes n to suggest that inwardness for Kierkegaard was 
“a hidden personal religiosity” in contrast to manifest religiosity of the monks and nuns in a community. 
Again, inwardness here is being cashed out in contrast o, as Roberts puts it “externalities” but the 
significance here is that Watkin understands inwardness in a religious context, namely the individual 
manifests a “hidden religiosity” in actions (the way one lives) not in wearing certain ecclesiastical clothing 
and religious garb.  
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context of the social and public trappings with which associates. However, in contrast to 
the former “externalities” the Latino male, in a moment of contemplative inwardness, re-
examines his values, projects, and most importantly his own lived experience. 
b) Existence 
Also closely related to subjectivity is existence. Kierkegaard assume  different 
modes of being, and is interested in a special type of existence that goes beyond th  
individual described and defined merely as a biological, psychological, and social 
animal.47 For Kierkegaard, the individual who truly “exists” is the individual who is 
personally committed to becoming a self, in despair realizes his or her freedom, and 
recognizes their responsibility for their actions. This type of existence is cashed out in the 
existence-spheres (the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of exitence).48  
                                                          
 
47 Climacus speaks of existence and existing in relation to the subjective thinker, we need to be 
aware that the Danish words for existence and existing: være til, Tilværelse, and existere have no counter-
parts in English; thus, all are translated as some form of “exist” in English. The noun Tilværelse (existence) 
refers generically to the sphere of human activity. In this sense, it parallels the term actuality. However, the 
Danish verb existere signifies a qualitative life beyond the life of immediacy; it underscores an aspect of a 
person’s ethical-religious striving and individual development (Watkin 2001). This sense of “to exist” i  to 
be contrasted with the Danish verb være til which refers to a person’s concrete physical existence in the 
world. 
 
48 I won’t belabor the issue by rehashing these domains of existence since that has already been 
covered. I will simple point that the spheres of existence set on display qualitatively different levels of 
existence. While the aesthetic stage of existence can be described as a humdrum and dull form of existnce 
it is a still a form of existence. However, the major flaw with the aesthetic domain is that it lacks authentic 
existence. The type of existence or level of existence in the aesthetic domain is characterized by a lack of 
responsibility to take one’s given nature (one’s specific hereditary and environment) and to shape and mol  
their own development by exercising free will. The latter state of affair is no different than the dull form of 
existence Kierkegaard describes as similar to the drunken pleasant passed-out in the back of a cart driven to 
and fro wherever the horse pleases (VII 267).  Authen ic existence begins in the ethical sphere of exist nce 
where the subject becomes self-conscious. Remaining i  this type of existence the subject is in the process 
of becoming an authentic self because the subject is “doing the choosing.” That is, the subject is now self-
directing her own life by resolutely making choices in passion. Passion will be discussed shortly.  
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The type of existence that appears at the ethical domain is in reference to ethical 
striving. That is, for Climacus, authentic existence, which begins in the ethical dom in, 
denotes a particular type of struggle or striving in the individual. 
But what is existence? It is that child who is begotten by the infinite and the finite, the eternal and 
the temporal, and is therefore continually striving (Post 1. 92 VII 71). 
That the existing subjective thinker is continually striving does not mean, however, that in a finite 
sense he has a goal toward which he is striving, where e would be finished when he reached it. 
No, he is striving infinitely, is continually in the process of becoming (Post 1.91 VII 72). 
Recall that for Kierkegaard, the self is a synthesis of contrasting factors (infinite and 
finite, temporal and eternal, and freedom and necessity).49 Authentic existence 
exemplified in an ethical struggle, then, is a struggle and a permanent tension to bring
together the temporal and the eternal. What does Climacus mean by the eternal? Fo  
Climacus, like Socrates, there is an infinite and eternal truth, and the subjective thinker 
has an essential relation to it; however this relationship is restricted by virtue of finitude 
cashed out in the temporality of human existence (Westphal 1996). The eternal, for 
Climacus, denotes what is perfect, complete, and unchanging as opposed to something 
that is imperfect, in process, and changing.50 The eternal in relation to the ethical, for 
Climacus, is not merely contemplating universal possibilities for their own sake, but 
rather contemplating universal possibilities as possibilities for action. That is, in the 
practical life some of these universal possibilities are moral possibilities, which can be 
                                                          
 
49 Against the idea that Kierkegaard was a Sartrean existentialist in that for humans, existence 
precedes essence; thus, we choose who we are in the sens  of having no nature prior to choosing, 
Kierkegaard maintains that human nature is a synthesis of contrasting factors. Thus, for Kierkegaard, the 
self has an ontological given that then becomes the task of every person to shape and mold into an authentic 
self. The choosing and creating of one’s self will be done within the metaphysical parameters of 
synthesizing these contrasting factors. 
 
50 C. Stephen Evans in, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript, discusses four significant uses of 




grasped not only as eternally binding on the individual, but also as universal and timeless 
duties transcending personal whim and cultural norms. Thus, one side of the struggle that 
emerges is that the eternal for the authentic existing being is the life-time struggle and 
striving to realize moral ideals, duties, and norms (C. S. Evans 1983).  
In a final note regarding the eternal, I must mention that for Climacus it is in he 
ethical domain that one encounters God. That is, for Climacus not only do all logical 
possibilities, but also moral possibilities, have their ground in God. Thus, when the 
authentic subject strives to become in the ethical domain, she is not only conscious of the 
moral law, to use Kant’s term, but the she becomes conscious of God by realizing her 
moral duties in action. Of course Climacus would not say that the subject has knowledge 
of God, but to be sure the subject encounters God or has existential awareness of God in 
her ethical striving. 
In contrast to the eternal and infinite stands the temporal and finitude, in which 
Climacus simply refers to as the temporal character of human existence. In other words, 
actualizing ethical duties (or any actions for that matter) must be done in time, and since 
the subject fails to realize his or her ideals fully, completely, and perfectly; she must 
realize these ideals in temporal striving. For example, it is one thing to realize that the 
subject ought to do X, but it is another thing for the subject to actually do X continually. 
Moreover, it is still another matter to do X (actualize X) within the constraints of one’s 
own spatial-temporal existence not to mention one’s own hereditary, social, and 
environmental limitations.  To invoke deep reflection upon the subject’s daily 
confrontation and struggle with the finite and temporal, Climacus asks, “What it means to 
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die?”51 Again, Climacus is not just mulling over dark existential themes for their own 
sake, but rather to awaken the authentic subject to the temporal and finite factors in 
human existence. That is, by being aware of our own impending death Climacus wants 
the subject to genuinely grapple with our own imperfect, temporal, and fragmented 
achievements.  However, the question remains, “How does the existing subject 
continually synthesize the eternal and temporal into her own existence?” For Climacus, 
the answer is found in passion.  
c) Passion 
Climacus writes, “Only momentarily can a particular individual, existing, be in a 
unity of the infinite and the finite that transcends existing. This instant is the moment of 
passion” (Post 1.197 VII 164). Before discussing how passion unifies the self as an 
integrated self, we need to see what is meant by passion. The passions, for Climacus, are 
not just an uncalculated burst of emotions where emotions quickly overtake the subject
and just as quickly disappear. Instead, for Climacus, passion must be “acquired” and 
“developed” in which the subject takes responsibility for his or her passion. In thissense, 
Kierkegaardian passions are certainly emotions, yet a certain type of emotions; more akin 
to what we call values (C. S. Evans 1983). Watkin notes that passion (Lide skab) is 
etymologically connected to the word for “suffer” (Lide) which is expressed in two ways: 
longing for something and that of suffering because of it. Thus, for Kierkegaard, passion 
can be negative or positive. Passions in the negative sense picks out “self-interested 
desires” and “unbridled emotions” such that appear at aesthetic sphere of existence while 
passions in the positive sense, refers to emotions/ values developed in the ethical-
                                                          
 
51 VII 137-147 
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religious domain (Watkin 2001). Passions and/or values must be honed and developed in 
order to give shape and direction to the subject. For example, consider the subject who 
realizes their finite and temporal limitations (perhaps coming from a lower social-
economic class and/or having certain physical limitations), yet imagines and presents to 
himself the non-actual (the possible- perhaps possibilities of a different life). All that has 
gone on in the subject at this point is reflection and thought. What is now needed is for 
the subject to bring to close the reflective process of the imagination (representing to 
himself various possibilities) and take a certain course of action; however, this can only 
happen when the subject decides to act. What moves the subject from reflective thought 
to taking a certain action? For Climacus, it is passion that moves the subject to true 
action. Nevertheless, in the case above, “What is the particular passion ‘called forth’ and 
‘cultivated’ that moves the subject to take action?” and “What is the object of this 
particular passion?” Following the case above, one could say that the particular passion 
called upon by the subject in order to move the subject to take a certain course of action 
is indignation and the object of this particular passion is social injustice. Again, both the 
passion of, say, indignation and the object of passion, let’s say, social injustice have their 
proper place in the ethical sphere of existence. That is, the universal ethical values of 
righteous anger and justice, Climacus would call “the eternal” is cashed out and has its 
touchstone with the subject’s finite and temporal existence in and through the subject’ 
action. There is a sense in which the eternal and the temporal are momentarily pulled 
together by the subject (in her action of decrying social injustice) which gives unity to the 
subject.  In this way, passions provide unity and integration to the subject; furthermore, 
passions and values enter human existence in and through the individual’s inwardness 
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and subjectivity. That is, subjectivity is the human aspect that appropriately deals with 
passions and value. However, in saying that passions and values are actualized in 
subjectivity, it doesn’t follow that they are simply subjective in the sense that they’re 
applicable to the particular subject only. Perhaps it is the case, as Evans suggests, that 
“values in themselves eternally valid might make contact with human life throug the 
emotions” (70). Now I will turn my attention to the final aspect of subjectivity; 
subjectivity and truth. 
IV) Subjectivity and Truth 
Subjectivity and truth is a notoriously controversial Kierkegaardian theme. It 
seems almost insulting and highly offensive to suggest to rational thinking people, 
especially philosophers, that truth and subjectivity are somehow linked. Climacus 
remarks: 
Objectivity the emphasis is on what is said; subjectivity the emphasis is on how it is said (Post 1. 
202, VII 169). 
Objectivity, the question is only about categories of thought; subjectivity, about inwardness. At its 
maximum this “how” is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the very truth. 
But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity is truth (Post 1.203, 
VII 170). 
Are we led to believe that Climacus is by some means presenting an epistemological 
relativism or skeptical relativism by saying that subjectivity is truth? Although such 
interpretations of Kierkegaard are popular, such a reading of Kierkegaard is unwarranted 
because there is good evidence showing that this is certainly not what Climacus (and 
Kierkegaard) is doing here.52 As we have already discussed, Climacus distinguishes 
                                                          
 
52Evans believes that such a misunderstanding in Kierkegaard is because Kierkegaard is mixing 
the philosophy of truth and the theology of salvation. That is, Kierkegaard begins by asking traditional 
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between objective thought and subjective thought. In making this distinction, he already 
presupposes that there are legitimate objects of objective knowledge such as, 
mathematics, logic, and science, but former domain of knowledge is inadequate in 
guiding us in ethical-religious concerns.  Moreover, by making a further distinct on 
regarding objective knowledge, that is, between divine knowledge and human 
knowledge, Climacus is not denying the existence of “the system” or a “world-historical” 
perspective. He is simply reminding us that this “divine objectivity” is not available to 
the human mind (86, 141, 158, 190). Similar to Kant, Climacus is denying that we can 
transcend our human situation in existence and view the world from a “God’s eye view 
point.”  Climacus writes: 
If, in the two definitions given, being [Væren] is understood as empirical being, then truth itself i  
transformed into a desideratum [something wanted] and everything is place in the process of 
becoming [Vorden], because the empirical object is not finished, and the existing knowing subject 
is itself in the process of becoming. Thus truth is an approximating whose beginning cannot be 
established absolutely, because there is no conclusion that has retroactive power (Post 1.189; VII 
157). 
Absolute knowledge is reserved alone for God and no human person because not only is 
the object of knowledge in process, but the subject of knowledge also is in process. In 
this sense, we are two times removed from possessing divine knowledge. In spite ofour 
“limited’ human situation, for Climacus, there is nevertheless, a crucially important 
dimension of human activity that eludes objectivity and therefore must be tapped into via 
another means. This means is subjectivity.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
epistemological questions regarding the nature of truth, but then ends his discussion by asking question  
about how a person can be “in the truth.” For Evans, the latter questions are a kin to the Christian co cept 
of salvation. I not convinced of this. Certainly Kierkegaard is asking traditional epistemological questions 
regarding the nature of truth. However, he is not aswering these questions in a strictly soteriological 
fashion, he is shifting the locus of truth from proositions to being, from propositional truth to true being.  
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Before discussing the details of Climacus’ theory of truth, it is necessary to get a 
brief glimpse of the big picture. Climacus is asking, “What is the relationship between the 
subject and truth?” Or put another way, “What is it like for the subject to be (exist) in the 
truth?” Usually, when discussing the nature of truth, contemporary philosophers examin  
the conditions that need to obtain in order for a proposition to be true or false. That is to 
say, the truth is discussed in relation to propositions instead of in relation to one’s being.  
Climacus doesn’t present a systematic theory of truth per se, but nevertheless, is 
committed to an underlying subjective theory of truth regarding ethical-religious 
matters53. That is to say, Climacus has an epistemology:   
1) There is divine objective truth (eternal truth). 
2) There is human objective truth (formal and tautological). 
3) Humans can’t have divine objective truth because we are in process of 
becoming (we are finite and limited). 
4) There are objects of knowledge that requires detachment (accidental objects: 
mathematics and logic). 
5) There are objects of knowledge that require passion and a high level of 
interestedness (non-accidental objects: self-understanding, ethics, and 
religion). 
6) Humans can have objective truth of accidental objects (mathematics and 
logic). 
                                                          
 
53 Louis Pojman in, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, finds three theories of truth in 
Kierkegaard’s writings: Reduplication Model of Subjectivity, Metaphysical Model of Subjectivity, and 
Necessary-Condition Model of Subjectivity (127-143).  
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7) Humans can’t have objective truth of non-accidental objects (self-
understanding, ethics, and religion). 
8) Humans can have subjective truth of non-accidental objects (self-
understanding, ethics, and religion). 
Now that some of the main features of Climacus’ theory of truth have been laid 
out, one may object that such a theory is all good and well as far as it attempts to 
safeguard a dimension of human activity from objectivity, but then, does this not open the 
flood gates to lunacy and madness, especially pertaining to religious claims? Perhaps it 
does. But Climacus, seemly anticipating such a natural objection, speaks to this very 
concern in a satire about madness. Climacus asks us to consider a lunatic who has 
escaped from the sanitarium and in order to conceal his insanity from the viewing public 
(for fear that he will be noticed and thus recommitted) he puts a little ball in thetail of his 
coat. When he walks the ball will strike his back side and in turn he will utter an 
objective truth (the earth is round). Thus, the man walks around saying, “Boom, the earth 
is round…Boom, the earth is round” in order to show the viewing public his sanity by the 
objective truth of what he says (Post 1.194-5, VII 162). For Climacus, the man’s madness 
shows itself not in his failure to be acquainted with objective truths, but “in his 
inappropriateness of his objective posture to his real-life situation” (Westphal 1987). The 
point Climacus is drawing our attention to is that those who attempt to extend objectivity 
beyond its proper bounds by enveloping the whole person for fear of the dangers of 
subjectivity (the most extreme form of subjectivity, for Climacus, is a Don Quixote type 
of madness) are displaying another form of madness by cutting away the vital inwardness 
of humanity and truncating the self. Is this not a type of madness too, Climacus wants us 
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to ask. That is, yes indeed, the what is important from an objective perspective, but is it 
not diminished if it is devoid of the how, the inwardness that makes the speaker human?  
To be sure, Climacus is not saying that what one believes is not really that 
important so long as one merely believes with sincerity and passion.54 Instead, Climacus 
is calling attention to a problem (the absence of subjectivity and inwardness applied to 
ethical-religious issues), which is, in his estimation, a more serious problem than getting 
what one believes right or wrong.  
So what ought to be the highest concern for humanity, dispassionate and detached 
objectivity or something else? Climacus answers this with another famous or infamous 
Kierkegaardian passage: 
An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is 
the truth, the highest truth there is for the existing person (Post 1.203, VII 170).    
 Again, Climacus never tires of reminding us that human objectivity is uncertain (it is a 
matter of approximation and is never finished and complete); it is therefore limit d. It is 
as if, Climacus thinks, we are repeatedly caught in a trap by thinking (and acting) that we 
can possess complete objective certainty (knowledge not available to us) meanwhil  we 
ignore the most important items that we can possess (self-knowledge, ethics, and 
religion).  Nevertheless, for Climacus, the highest good that ought to occupy every fiber 
of our being (our total existence) is the ethical-religious domain.  
The quintessential champion of subjective appropriation in the jaws of objective 
uncertainty, for Climacus, is none other than Socrates (1.204-1.213).  Climacus thinks 
                                                          
 
54This type of reasoning is exemplified in subjective and cultural relativism. Ultimate truth is 
devoid of human possession; thus, truth is simply a matter of personal taste and subjective feeling.  
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that subjective truth is analogous to Socrates’ wisdom in that 1) there is an elemet of 
risk in faith, and 2) subjective truth is what ought to occupy our lives. That is to say, 
Socrates stakes his entire life upon (he lives and ultimately dies for) the question, “I  
there an immortality?(1.201)” Climacus understands this as a case of “passionate 
appropriation of objective uncertainty” in that what was objectively uncertain was that 
man is immortal; yet, this was the very truth that drove Socrates. The truth, “the 
immortality of humanity” was for Climacus a truth about the eternal, yet was essential to 
the meaning of the existing person within the constraints of temporality. The paradox, for 
Climacus, was that Socrates existed in the spatial-temporal world and yet was a tempting 
at the same time with passion to apprehend eternity from a temporal standpoint. Aga , 
Climacus casts the life of Socrates as a life lived in the strenuous project of attempting to 
wrestle with what it means to exist in the truth as opposed to merely “knowing” the tru . 
Conclusion 
Although Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity is broad and diverse, as 
demonstrated above, nevertheless there are aspects of his conception of subjectivity that 
are important to any individual (contemplating his or her own existence) and, as I’m
convinced, important in particular to the problems regarding Latino male self-
transformation. Thus, elements of Kierkegaard’s subjectivity demand serious 
consideration.  I will conclude this chapter by briefly highlighting some areas of 
Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity that will be discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to 
the problem of Latino male self-transformation. 
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1) Regarding subjective thinking, Kierkegaard provides not only a useful 
standpoint whereby one may posture or orient one’s thinking in order to face 
certain existential problems, but Kierkegaard is able to bring to light how a) 
certain problems can only be appropriately dealt with via a certain way of 
thinking, namely subjective thinking, and how b) the objective mode of 
thinking and reflecting upon certain existential problems doesn’t absolve the 
individual from the existential-ethical task at hand. 
2) Kierkegaard’s insight on subjectivity and indirect communication, open up 
certain categories of thinking about certain issues. In particular, it opens up 
the discussion regarding the individual examining different life-possibilities 
and then struggling to decide what life-possibilities should be actualized. 
Thus, Kierkegaard’s remarks on subjectivity inevitably bring into focus life-
possibilities and moral obligations. 
3) From the perspective of Subjectivity as inwardness, existence, and passion, 
Kierkegaard is able to bring to the discussion many invaluable insights such 
as: a) inwardness which speaks to the issue of the subject intentionally putting 
his or herself  in a vulnerable position “standing apart from one’s social status 
and social trappings” in order to face the problem of one’s own existence, b) 
existence which refers to a type of existence, as opposed to mere biological 
existence, that requires a struggle with what one ought to do within the 
constraints of one’s own spatial-temporal existence, c) passion which refers to 
movement from possibility to actuality by which the eternal and the temporal 
come together. The latter is cashed out in terms of bringing the subject’s life-
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projects from the starting point in imagination to the point of actuality, and 
most importantly for Kierkegaard such a task in turn provides the subject with 
integration and unity. 
4) Via Subjectivity and Truth Kierkegaard is able to bring to the fore the notion 
of existing in the truth as opposed to “knowing” the truth regarding 
existential-ethical issues. This distinction is crucial for Kierkegaard in that one 
can “know” the truth but yet fail to exist in the truth. Moreover, Kierkegaard 
will again insist that 1) certain issues can only be faced in a subjective 
manner, and 2) existing in the truth is more important in some cases than 
knowing the truth.    
Now that I have explicated Kierkegaard’s conceptions of the self and subjectivity, I w ll 










Chapter III – Kierkegaard and Latino Male Self-Transformation 
Introduction 
Now that aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy has been discussed, in particular 
the notions of self and subjectivity, the difficult task lies ahead in reconciling these 
notions with the contemporary issue of Latino male self-transformation. That is, what 
does Kierkegaard’s version of religious identity have to do with ethnic identity in general 
and Latino/a identity in particular? I’m persuaded that there are indeed asp cts of 
Kierkegaard’s thought that can be brought to bear on identity issues and especially Latino 
male self-transformation.  
In this chapter, I will discuss Latino male self-transformation as this is presented 
by David T. Abalos in The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition.55 I will examine the 
relationship of this conception of self-transformation with Kierkegaard’s notio  f the 
                                                          
 
55 For my discussion of Latino-male transformation, I will primarily focus on the work of David T. 
Abalos, especially as it is put forward in The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). However, I will draw from other works by Abalos in order present his 
theory. These other works include: Latinos in the United States: the Sacred and the Political  (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) and La Comunidad Latina in the United States: Personal 
and Political Strategies for Transforming Culture (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998). 
Abalos notes that he is heavily indebted to Manfred Halpern’s work and research on the subject of 
transformation. See Manfred Halpern, Transforming the Personal, Politcal, Historical and Sacred in 
Theory and Practice (London: University of Scranton Press, 2009). I do refer to Halpern work at times in 
order to clarify the overall schematic of self-transformation, but my focus will be on Abalos’ work because 





self and subjectivity. This chapter will be presented in three movements. First, I will 
briefly explicate Abalos’ theory of transformation. This task will unfold by 1) addressing 
the core drama of life which itself gives way to three central movements: emanation, 
incoherence, and transformation, and 2) explicating four of the nine archetypal 
relationships. Second, I will bring to view the agreement between Abalos’ theory and 
Kierkegaard. Lastly, I discuss contributions that Kierkegaard can indeed make to the 
modern Latino male self-transformation problem. I will argue that Kierkegaard’s remarks 
on the self and subjectivity can provide impetus for the task of Latino male self-
transformation.  
Abalos’ Theory of Self-Transformation 
In The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition, David T. Abalos presents his theory 
of Latino male self-transformation.56 Abalos’ explicates his theory of transformation in 
terms of a “fundamental structure” of human existence which is “given to us in the core 
drama of life,” a drama with three central acts which engenders three ways of life (Abalos 
2002). In other words, the core drama of life unfolds in three central movements: 
emanation, incoherence, and finally transformation, and each movement is characterized 
by its own way of life. The problem arises when Latino males “arrest themselves in a 
fragment of this journey” and thus circumvent genuine transformation (49). According to 
                                                          
 
56 Social labels and ethnic names such as Latino/a, Hispanic, and Chicano/a are extremely 
important because such names and labels typically appear in the context of political agendas. For example, 
ethnic names play a crucial role in terms of both disempowerment and empowerment. I discuss ethnic 






Abalos, before reaching the third act (the act of transformation) Latino males “stunt their 
manhood in a fragment of the core drama” and the result is a partial and fragmented self 
(51). Complicating the matter, for Abalos, there are certain forces (political, e onomical, 
cultural, ecclesiastical etc.) that prevent and hinder progressive movement into the third 
way of life, the life of transformation. In what follows, I will discuss in more detail the 
various “acts” and “ways of life” that compose Abalos’ theory.  
I. The Life of Emanation 
The way of emanation is the first act in which the Latino male finds himself; this 
act is characterized by two scenes. Scene one is described as the archetypal drama of 
patriarchy, which simple means a drama of ‘systematic domination of women by men’ 
whereby this drama gets played out in the lives of many Latino males. Abalos provides a 
list of concrete examples ranging from women seen primarily as producers of children 
and women’s main task in life is to be housewives to women are never allowed to be 
economically autonomous. For Abalos, these inherited “stories of patriarchy” are told and 
retold and are continuously reinforced and defended by the various “lords of emanation,” 
guardians of the inherited tradition (54). Again, the “lords of emanation” are those 
various forces such as: political, economical, cultural, and ecclesiastical for es that 
defend the status quo and hinder authentic transformation. For example, many Latino 
males because they don’t question this inherited tradition become arrested in the wayof 
life of emanation; as a result, their self is wounded, fragmented, and above all they lack a 
complete self. Consequently, there is no development of new consciousness only the 




For those Latino males that dare to imagine a different way of life enter into scene 
II of Act I. According to Abalos, when new ideas and intuitions are entertained regarding 
an alternative way of life, the Latino male is ready to leave Act I altogether.  What 
Abalos seems to have in mind here is that when the Latino male imaginatively conceives 
or puts forward alternative stories that are “fundamentally new and more loving” the 
possibilities open up for the Latino male to move into the next way of life.57 At this point 
there is no direct action per se, only the mental activity of taking these “n w doubts and 
intuitions seriously” (54). What exactly “taking seriously” these new doubts and 
intuitions means for Abalos is not spelled out, but one could juxtapose two cases of 
reflection to see what Abalos has in mind here. Consider the Latino male who is steeped 
in the traditional stories of patriarchy and female domination; however, when he is 
challenged by alternative stories of love and care, he merely dismisses the  s ories as 
weak and feminine. On the other hand, consider the Latino male who is also captured in 
the same traditional way of life rooted in patriarchy. When confronted with altern tive 
stories and ways of life, instead of merely dismissing them as weak, he reflects upon 
these alternative ways of life. Furthermore, when these consciously conceived alternative 
ways of life are met with opposition by the defenders of the status quo or as Abaloscalls 
them, “lords of emanation,” he keeps reflecting upon these stories; he keeps putting 
forward to himself these alternative stories of love and care. In the latter scenario, we can 
say that he takes the new ideas and intuitions “seriously,” although at this point no direct 
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tested and retested in order to, “discern whether or not they are fundamentally new and better or if they are 





action has taken place whereas in the former case the new ideas and intuitions are not 
taken seriously at all.  
II. The Life of Incoherence 
Predicated upon taking these new ideas and intuitions seriously, Act II scene one, 
the way of life of incoherence emerges. It is in this scene where direct action materializes 
in the forms of open rebellion. For Abalos, the rebellion is a break from “parents and 
other authority figures” especially defenders of the traditional destructive way of life 
(45). However, rebellion at this point is difficult for many Latino males because, just like 
the lords of emanation in Act I, Act II also has its forces that seek to deny authentic 
Latino male self-transformation. 
The lords of incoherence are particularly difficult to resist because these forces 
are tied to power. For example, many of these “lords,” according to Abalos, are played 
out in the midst of the story of capitalism; thus, resisting the lords of incoherence requires 
breaking away from deeply entrenched power structures that have served to maintain the 
status quo. Abalos remarks, “The lord of incoherence inspires them [Latino males] to 
practice their masculinity in the pursuit of power and self-interest” (55). The way of life 
of incoherence has the power to turn Latino males “against each other in a perpetual 
competition that sours relationships into contests of mutual suspicion and fear” and 
consequentially, a partial and lesser self emerges. In particular, the hatred that is set on 
display in this way of life is not only directed at others but is also directed at the self 
engendered by the belief that somehow Latino males are inferior to other males until 




One of the most powerful tools for maintaining and extending power is through 
the use of names and labels such as social names like Hispanic, Latino, and Chicano. I’m 
of aware of complexity behind using social labels such as Latino, Hispanic, and Chicano. 
The difficulties are numerous ranging from philosophical, social, and historical to the 
political domain. For example, these problems range from legitimate philosophical 
concerns such as the notion of identity to more general problems of names and naming 
(i.e. what do these names and labels such as ‘Latino’ and ‘Hispanic’ refer to?). The social 
concerns are equally problematic especially regarding race and ethnicity. H storical 
concerns regarding these labels also appear in terms of locating where and when these 
names and labels first appeared, whereas the political domain opens up the difficulties 
regarding these names and labels used as tools to oppress and maintain certain power 
structures, and whether these names and labels are indeed self-imposed or imposed from 
the outside. In the latter case, a people group may be disempowered simply becausethey 
are being named by the “other.” That is, when the ruling elite apply ethnic names to those 
that they rule over, then naming is a powerful tool to maintain power over people and 
eventually dehumanized people.  Equally true, when disempowered people name 
themselves this can serve as a tool of empowerment and transformation. 
For Abalos, the archetypal drama of capitalism, manifests itself in the various sub 
stories: We wear masks, all of our relationships are in danger of being corrupted by the 
competition for power, we belong to impersonal systems that turn us into fragments, and 
nobody knows the individual in his or her wholeness ju t to name a few. Latino men are 




rather than making a break from this way of life, often Latino men misdirect their anger 
at each other and become arrested in the life of incoherence. 
Abalos goes on to point out that a subtle temptation exists to think that the enemy 
here is Anglos. However, this is wrong-headed because the problem isn’t with the color 
of people’s skin. Latino males can echo stories as anecdotal evidence of the fact
Latino male domination can and indeed does occur by Latino males as well. So, the 
problem doesn’t necessarily reside with the color of people’s skin, but rather the probl m 
resides within the capitalist system itself. Abalos concurs on this point regardin  the 
Anglo power holders as he notes, “They are not the enemy; they are also victims of a 
story that destroys their humanity when people become obsessed with greed and power” 
(56-57).58 What is needed, according to Abalos, is a radical break from the system that 
dehumanizes and leaves Latino males fragmented in its wake; what is needed is a 
refocusing of the anger at the root of the problem. 
Scene II of Act II places the Latino male at a crossroads of decision: “either they 
empty themselves of the stories and partial ways of life that have possessed them or they 
turn to violence in order to hang on to the old stories, thereby hurting themselves and 
others” (57). The former claim is interesting in that Abalos suggests that “turning to 
violence” is a means of holding on to the old stories. What Abalos has in mind here is 
                                                          
 
58 Paulo Freire sums this point up as he remarks in, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, “In order for this 
struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to 
create it), become in turn oppressors of the oppresso s, but rather restorers of the humanity of both. This, 
then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and their opp essors 
as well. The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and r pe by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power 




that many Latino males have become so wounded and excluded from realms of power 
that they eventually seek out other fragmented forms of power and act out repressed 
anger. In other words, many Latino males transition from becoming victims to becoming 
victimizers. This is evident with Latino gang affiliations wherein Latino males join gangs 
and the like in order to assert themselves within a system where they virtually lack any 
true power. Abalos adds that many Latino males are caught between “two crumbling 
ways of life: in the life of emanation they are trying to uphold the legitimation of 
masculine power, and in the world of capitalism they are failing to succeed” (58). The 
result of these failed realities for Latino males is acting out violence against themselves 
and the greater Latino community. Sadly, the violence is often directed at Latinas, 
especially when Latinas challenge the deeply engrained stories of machis o.59 
The other option available to Latino males is “empty themselves of the old stories 
and partial ways of life” and embrace a new healthy consciousness. Again, Abalos
doesn’t exactly explain how one goes about “emptying themselves” of these old 
destructive stories, but he does provide his personal account of how this process could 
                                                          
 
59 Obviously I am not asserting that violence against women is a Latino or Chicano problem. 
Rather, the problem is a male problem, but from the s andpoint of a Latino male it is a Latino male 
problem. For more on violence against women as a male problem see, Jackson Katz, The Macho Paradox: 
Why some Men hurt Women and What all Men can do to help,(2006, 2-34). David Abalos makes these 
remarks regarding machismo as a male problem: I want to stress that whatever I say about the Latino Male 
is not particular to him; except for concrete cultural specifics, the stories and the ways of life discussed in 
relation to Latino men apply to all men from all other ethnic and racial backgrounds. Each culture has 
particular concrete differences as to how stories remain the same for all cultures. All human beings struggle 
with the same archetypal dramas. Patriarchy is patriarchy whether we find it in Mexico, Hong Kong, 
England, Saudi Arabia, France, Spain, Peru, Nigeria, o  in the Latino barrios of the United States. Wherever 






begin. For Abalos, the “emptying” process begins in and through personal questioning, 
critically evaluating the stories of patriarchy, and seeking help inside an  outside the 
Latino community.  
III.  The Life of Transformation 
The final stage or act of the Core Drama of Life is Act III, the way of 
transformation. Immediately Abalos closes off the option that transformation and a 
healthy self can emerge in and through religious institutions. There are at least two 
reasons why Abalos thinks this is the case: 1) religious institutions are themselv s a part 
of the overarching problem of patriarchy rooted in capitalism, and 2) religious institut ons 
perpetuate the story of patriarchy in especially destructive and effective ways. What is 
needed is a transformation a part from patriarchy religious institutions; ge uine 
transformation is transformation “that touches personal, political, historical, and sacred 
faces of life” (61). Abalos remarks 
To journey through the story of transformation as the core drama of life is the vocation to 
which all humans are called. A decisive break-through has been accomplished when 
Latino males realize that their greatest freedoms are to (1) become conscious of the 
archetypal ways of life, stories, and relationships they are living, (2) prepare themselves 
to choose some and reject others, and (3) participae n creating more loving and just 
archetypal stories and relationships in the service of transformation (Abalos 2002). 
It is worth noting that for any transformation to take place direct action will have to be 
engaged in. In other words, transformation cannot just be a mental and imaginative 
exercise. Abalos remarks above make this very explicit, “participate in creating more 
loving and just archetypal stories and relationships.” For Abalos, once old stories and 
archetypes are uprooted and destroyed, the Latino male needs to take direct action in 
order to replace these archetypes with new ones. Furthermore, creating new arch types 




dependent upon the other, that is, relationships in the greater community. Abalos 
discusses nine archetypal relationships enacted in all ways of life. To this issue I now 
turn. 
 In order to create new archetypal stories, new stories that will be essentially social 
and political, one must understand the basic relationship structures found in all social 
ways of life. Abalos discusses nine basic relationship structures: emanation, subjection, 
buffering, isolation, direct bargaining, autonomy, incoherence, deformation, and 
transformation. Again, treatment of all nine relationship structures is beyond the scop  of 
the present work, and the archetypal relationships that I will briefly examine will not be 
exhaustive. However, I will offer an explanation of four of the nine relationship 
structures because I believe that they are of central importance to my remarks on 
Kierkegaard and Abalos.60 Before discussing four of the nine relationship structures, it is 
necessary to point out that for Abalos, these relationship structures can be infused i  all 
the ways of life formerly discussed: emanation, incoherence, and transformation. That is, 
the nine relationship structures or patterns can be dispersed throughout the various acts 
and scenes assumed by all people. Manfred Halpern’s remarks on the nine archetypal 
relationships are insightful here,  
There exist only nine archetypal relationships shaping our capacity (or power) and our 
performance with any others we encounter in our life-any others, not only other human 
                                                          
 
60 An in depth account of all nine archetypal relationship structure is available in the following 
works: David T. Abalos, Latinos in the United States: The Sacred and the Political 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p.33-46; Manfred Halpern, Transforming the Personal, 






beings…our analysis of the potentials and limits of each archetypal relationship can 
explain a lot about life, but no such relationship can be experienced except within 
archetypal stories and, most decisively, within ways of life (Halpern 2009).  
Abalos takes Halpern’s insight and research on the nine archetypal relationships and 
specifically apply these nine relationship patterns to the lives of Latino males. In what 
follows, I will discuss the archetypal relationships of emanation, subjection, buffering, 
and isolation in this order. 
  The Relationship of Emanation 
 The relationship of emanation is characterized by treating another person as an 
extension of oneself (65). In other words, relationships patterned after emanation are 
relationships in which “the self lives to the maximum extent possible as an extension of, 
or at least in unquestioning conformity with, the other.”61  That is, the self accepts the 
denial of freedom and autonomy to explore and express his or her own capacity (his or 
her own power) in order to rest secure in the mysterious and overwhelming power of the 
source of this emanation. For example, sons and daughters emanate or duplicate the 
Father, Mother, Uncle, Aunts, and other authority figures. Emanation relationships are 
unavoidable and certainly necessary; however, they can also go wrong depending upon in 
which stage or way of life they are employed.  For example, in the life of emanation the 
Latina may emanate or pattern the mother who is subservient to an abusive husband and 
never questions her loyalty to a patriarchal way of life and the “payoff,” so to peak, is a 
type of security (which is really no security at all).  Or consider the Latino male who also 
emanates or patterns an abusive father or an abusive authority figure in which patriarchy 
and machismo is an extension handed down generation after generation. Again, the 
                                                          





reward in the latter example is the security that the Latino male obtains by not having his 
power and authority questioned with his limited context. Emanation relationships do not 
necessarily need to be misdirected.  For example, consider emanation relati ships 
extended in the life of transformation.  Latino males and Latinas who are whole selves
may be ideal role models for young Latinos looking for authority figures to imi ate. Next, 
Abalos turns his attention to the relationship pattern of subjection. 
  The Relationship of Subjection 
  Subjection is the next most effective relationship for providing unequal control. 
Relationships of subjection are characterized by conscious conflict on both a micro and 
macro level.62 That is, unlike the relationships of emanation where conflict between 
Latino males and the other is unconscious repressed, in relationships of subjection this 
conflict is conscious. For example, in subjection the Latino male is consciously aware
that he subjects Latinas and others to his patriarchal power, and the “other” is also aw re 
of their own subjection. This power is no longer “mysterious,” as we have seen in 
emanation but rather is “naked,” adds Abalos (66). The relationship of subjection has 
many variants such as Latino males exercising power over Latinas in the form of denying 
her freedom to control family finances, pursue her education, having social relationships 
outside the home etc. Furthermore, the subjection doesn’t merely move in the direction 
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from the Latino male to the Latina, but also moves in the direction from the social power
holders toward Latino males. In this sense, Latino males are aware that they possess very 
little social and political power and thus, “lost their right to step forward and initiate 
change” (66). The message is clear. Latina women are aware that they have very little 
power and accept this as they believe this to be the normal result of the supremacy of 
male power. Vis-à-vis Latino males are aware that they too have very little social and 
political power compared to Anglo power holders, and they also believe this to be normal 
result of the supremacy of the White males. Abalos next discusses relationships i  which 
conflict is filtered through intermediaries.  
  The Relationship of Buffering 
 The relationship of buffering is the relationship pattern that exemplifies “confli t 
and change” managed by intermediaries (67). These buffers can take various forms uch 
as mediators, arbitrators, political or economic power brokers, concepts, theories, 
standardized procedures, habits, conventions, routines, and rituals (Halpern 2009). In 
other words, buffering relationships are cashed out in accordance to rules and standard  
which in turn have consequences for each party involved in the relationship. The parties 
of the relationship need not be directly aware of the rules and standards, and indeed the 
rules and standards may be unconsciously adhered to and obeyed. Furthermore, these 
rules and standards tend to favor those who maintain the power in the relationship such as 
we see when “bureaucrats treat the less powerful impersonally according to the rubric 
under which their problem is ruled to fit- or not even fit at all under any present rubric,” 
according to Halpern (245). Abalos applies this relationship structure to Latinos in terms 




intervention of intermediaries. That is, Latinos by having padrinos, comadres, and others 
engage as mediators not only circumvent the sphere where one takes responsibility for h s 
or her own action but worse, these buffering relationships dispersed in the way of life of 
incoherence further engenders a partial and wounded self.  
  The Relationship of Isolation 
 In the relationship of isolation parties agree (sometimes implicitly or explicitly) to 
isolate themselves in order to avoid change. Again, the isolation can occur on a micro or 
macro plane in terms of personal isolation such as individual persons isolating themselves 
or being isolated by others or in macro terms of nation-states isolating themselv s or 
being isolated by other nation-states. In the relationship of isolation, Halpern remarks, 
“the poles [the various parties involved] agree to collaborate- but solely in avoiding all 
conflict intended to lead to any change in the relationship between the self and the 
other”.63 In other words, a key characteristic to the relationship of isolation is the mutual 
agreement of both parties involved to put themselves in a position of isolation in the first 
place. Isolation cashed out in these terms then, only works when both parties agree to the 
terms of isolation. For example, if we consider a case of isolation in the service of 
emanation, we can think of a Latina who is caught within the destructive story of 
patriarchy and who is isolated at various levels. She may be isolated from “male 
conversation” at dinner time or isolated in the home in order to fulfill “womanly domestic 
duties” or perhaps isolated from economic autonomy. Such cases of isolation only work 
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because both parties “tacitly” agree to them for the sake of maintaining the status quo or 
having a semblance of peace and compatibility. 
 In sum, I have discussed the main contours of Abalos’ theory of transformation. 
There are three ways of life each with their own unique acts/scenes: the life of emanation, 
incoherence, and transformation. Specifically, Latino males arrest themselv s at certain 
points prior to transformation and as a result are deeply wounded, fragmented, and are 
void of a complete self. This journey to transformation (or the lack there of) is 
exemplified in the real world through the nine relationship patterns/ structures: 
emanation, subjection, buffering, isolation, direct bargaining, autonomy, incoherence, 
deformation, and transformation. 
 Now that I have spelled out David Abalos’ theory of transformation, I now want 
to turn my attention to the relationship between Kierkegaard and Abalos. I am persuaded 
that there exists an uncanny similarity between Kierkegaard and Abalos and furthermore 
a certain “indebtedness” to Kierkegaard on behalf of Abalos. However, with all this said, 
I certainly recognize the non-similarities and disagreements between and Kierkegaard 
and Abalos. In my remarks on the agreement between Kierkegaard and Abalos, I bring 
attention to the main points of concurrence and similarity, and I have been cautious to let 
each of the authors words stand on their own without me attempting to force agreement 
where is none.  
Agreement between Kierkegaard and Abalos 
 The points of contact and agreement between Kierkegaard and Abalos are 




situating the self within the metaphysical framework of stages or spheres of existence, 2) 
the self understood as a composite being, and 3) the ethical obligation to construct a 
healthy and complete self.  
I. Metaphysical framework of Stages or Spheres of Existence 
 Both Kierkegaard and Abalos assume a notion of stages or spheres of existence in 
which to situate, analyze, and discuss the human condition. In other words, there is 
agreement between their metaphysical schemes in which our lives unfold and play out. 
For Kierkegaard, the theory of stages or spheres of existence emerges through his entire 
pseudonymous writings which not only force the individual to confront their life and 
existence as a journey with many options to choose from, but also demands of the 
individual to take upon the task of becoming one’s true self.  
Kierkegaard in no way wanted to cast type the numerous “ways” that humans 
exist: lifestyles, occupations, ceremonies, rituals, habits, customs etc., but he did think 
that there were three basic categories in which all these ways of life could be placed. 
These categories are the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.  
There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The 
metaphysical is abstraction, and there is no human being who exists metaphysically. The 
metaphysical, the ontological, is [er], but it does not exist [er ikke til], for when it exists it 
does so in the esthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction 
from or a prius [something prior] to the esthetic, the ethical, the religious (SLW 476). 
Abalos also situates humanity in the context of stages or spheres of existence which has 
as its highest goal transformation. Abalos makes these remarks regarding his theory of 
transformation: 
This theory is not an abstraction. It is an invitation to understand and participate in a 




rediscover the deeper reality of the Latino male is ba ed on the discovery that there is a 
fundamental structure to life that is given to us by the core drama of life, a drama with 
three acts. Many Latino men either arrest themselve in a fragment of this journey, the 
partial ways of life of emanation, incoherence, anddeformation, or they move toward its 
fulfillment by journeying through all three acts of the drama until they reach 
transformation (D. T. Abalos 2002). 
There are a host of inevitable questions that come to the surface when discussing any 
kind of stage theory. For example, are “spheres of existence” or “ways of life” type 
theories merely conceptual tools or are these theories making stronger claims such as 
claims regarding the nature of the world and the nature of the human condition? Any 
cursory reading of their theories will demonstrate that for both Kierkegaard and Abalos, 
the notions of stages of existence or ways of life are far more than simply conceptual 
schemes (although they are at least this) that help outsiders such as a social scient st make 
sense of the data or phenomena. Kierkegaard regards stages of existence as modes of
being-in-the-world, a perception that provides meaning and coherence to one’s beliefs,
practices, and customs (Westphal). The latter is evident when Kierkegaard vi the
pseudonym Victor Eremita in Either/Or, describes the condition of the aesthete or the 
mode of being-in-the-world for the aesthete. The aesthete is enveloped within a certain 
mode of existing that operates according to pre-ethical norms. That is, the aesthetic life-
sphere, according to “A’s” papers, is really a multiplicity of ways of existing: everything 
from the dispirited soul too bored to move to the aesthete lost in apathy (remaining 
indifferent to any choice at all). Below is a brief sampling of such disposition  grounded 
in the aesthetic life-sphere.  
I don’t feel like doing anything. I don’t  feel like riding- the motion is too powerful; I 
don’t feel like walking- it is too tiring; I don’t feel like lying down, for either I would 
have to stay down, and I don’t feel like doing that, or I would have to get up again, and I 





What is going to happen? What will the future bring? I do not know, I have no 
presentiment. When a spider flings itself from a fixed point down into its consequences, it 
continually sees before it an empty space in which it an find no foothold, however much 
it stretches. So it is with me; before me is continually an empty space, and I am propelled 
by a consequence that lies behind me. This life is turned around and dreadful, not to be 
endured. (I.8) 
My life achievement amounts to nothing at all, a mood, a single color. My achievement 
resembles the painting by that artist who was supposed to paint the Israelites’ crossing of 
the Red Sea and to that end painted the entire wall red and explained that the Israelites 
had walked across and that the Egyptians were drowned. (I.12) 
How empty and meaningless life is,- we bury a man; we accompany him to the grave, 
throw three spadefuls of earth on him; we ride out in a carriage, ride home in a carriage; 
we find consolation in the thought that we have a long life ahead of us. But how long is 
seven times ten years? Why not settle it all at once, why not stay out there and go along 
down into the grave and draw lots to see to whom will befall the misfortune of being the 
last of the living who throws the last three spadefuls of earth on the last of the dead? 
(I.14) 
Notice that images of the aesthete are not merely a fanciful description of the aest te, 
but rather images of an individual at the aesthetic sphere of existence. Again, this s 
meant to show that for Kierkegaard, the spheres of existence are more than merely a 
conceptual tool but rather a matrix of various ways of life that the individual must 
contend with.  
Similar to Kierkegaard, Abalos also remarks that his stage theory is far more than 
just another conceptual tool that provides us with predictive power allowing us to 
increase our knowledge of Latino males. In fact, Abalos sees such approaches as 
problematic for dealing with the real lived experiences of Latino males. 
Modern social science had reduced its pursuit of the understanding of the Latino male to 
statistics, variables, and the use of questionnaires. Many social scientists want to quantify 
the facts about Latino men in an attempt to create a mathematical certainty they hope will 
capture the meaning of Latino culture and people. None of their methodologies or 
instruments have proven capable of revealing what is really happening on the deeper 
levels in the lives of Latino men. (D. T. Abalos 200 ). 
Abalos further adds that his theory doesn’t merely describe the outward manifestation of 




as patriarchal machismo” and demonstrates how they can “participate in the process of 
transformation” (D. T. Abalos 2002). 
 Before moving on, I can’t resist turning to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on his 
notion of “forms of life” in order to clarify both Kierkegaard’s and Abalos’ stage 
theories. In The Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein seeks to clear up a 
misunderstanding regarding language and in particular the assumption that there is an 
underlying essence of our language. Wittgenstein introduces his concept of language-
games in order to drive this point home. For Wittgenstein, the concept ‘language-gam ’ 
is meant to bring to the fore the fact that the sp aking of language is part of an activity, or 
of a form of life" (PI 23). That is, what enables language to function and therefore must 
be accepted as a "given" is precisely forms of life. 64Of course spelling out what exactly 
Wittgenstein had in mind with the notion of “form of life” is no easy task. However, if I 
take Wittgenstein to mean by “form of life” a shared common matrix of humanity which 
grounds and makes sense of our sociological, historical, linguistic, physiological, and 
behavioral determinants, then we see something similar with both Kierkegaard and 
Abalos’ “ways of life” theories. In my estimation, Abalos and Kierkegaard stage theories 
are akin to Wittgenstein’s notion form of life (even though Kierkegaard wrote prior to 
Wittgenstein) in that they attempt to not only locate a ground for the plethora of our 
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human activities but also seek to locate our human activities within a context or frame of 
reference. 
Another similarity for both Kierkegaard and Abalos is that their theories are non-
necessary on several different levels. One, for both Kierkegaard and Abalos, their en ir  
metaphysical framework (stages of existence and ways of life) are not a necessary cosmic 
and progressive outgrowth from immaturity to maturity or from local consciousness to 
absolute consciousness, like we find in Hegel.  Rather, both metaphysical schemes are 
simply assumed from the outset as the starting point or the ground for the human 
condition.  In other words, both Kierkegaard and Abalos begin their own Genesis account 
as, “In the beginning…there were stages of existence or ways of life!” However, within 
these metaphysical frameworks, the individual has the choice to actualize certain ways of 
life as opposed to other ways of life.  
Secondly, both theories are teleological in the sense that both theories are goal or 
“end” oriented in which the ultimate end goal for both theories is authentic selfhood. Of 
course obtaining this goal is not a “given” or an automatic certainty. Rather, both the ries 
confront the individual with various ways of life and then demand of the individual to 
choose or actualize (through choice) these life possibilities. Again, because there is no 
metaphysical necessity on either scheme, the individual cannot expect to move from the 
aesthetic to the religious sphere of existence a la Kierkegaard nor the way of life of 
emanation to the way of life of transformation a la Abalos simply by be-ing. Instead, 
both theories place high importance on the individual’s choice to actualize or not the 




II.  The Self understood as a Composite Being 
In the previous chapters, I have already demonstrating that for Kierkegaard the 
self is an amalgam of three components: a synthesis of opposing factors, a relation that 
relates itself to itself, a relation grounded by the “other.”65 My main focus here is to 
briefly call attention to Abalos’ conception of the self and draw out the similarities ( f 
indeed there are any) to Kierkegaard’s conception of the self. As will be demonstrated 
shortly, both Kierkegaard and Abalos’ conception of the self will not be completely 
isomorphic in fact some features will be in direct opposition to one another. However, my 
central point is that both Kierkegaard and Abalos see the individual as a composite being 
even though both disagree on what exactly these the components are.    
Abalos’ conception of the self is found in his remarks on the four faces of 
humanity. These four faces are what Abalos refers to as the personal, the political, the 
historical, and the sacred.  
Each Latino man and Latina woman has a personal, a political, a historical, and a sacred face. But 
only in the service of transformation can they fully experience and express the four faces of their 
being. The process of transformation takes place first of all in the individual’s depths, in her or his 
personal face…At every moment of our lives we are somewhere in the core drama of life, in one 
of its acts and scenes, in one of the stories, in one of the nine relationships, in one of the four ways 
of life, practicing the four faces of our being [italicize mine] (D. T. Abalos 2002). 
In addition to our biological existence, for Abalos, there are four aspects of our being. 
The personal face of our being refers to the aspect of our being “that is responding to the 
inspiration to free itself to participate creatively with the deepest source f our being” 
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(Halpern 2009). It is evident that for Abalos, this aspect of the self is not a substantial elf 
or ego nor is it mere subjectivity but rather it is the aspect of our humanity that comes to 
know itself. In other words, similar to Socrates’ vocational imperative to, “know thyself,” 
the personal face of our being refers to our human vocation and responsibility to seek the 
truth in our current situation. This involves questioning and testing (at a personal level) 
the various ways of life that we have inherited (consciously or not) and the directive to 
free ourselves from the ways of life that have proved to be destructive to ourselves and 
others. Thus, the aspect of the self called “the personal face of our being” is not so much 
a metaphysical postulate of a substantial ego at it is the aspect of the self t at recognizes 
the need for liberation and vocation of self-transformation.66 Before moving on, I 
mention in passing that one of the components of Kierkegaard self, as discussed earlier 
that dovetails appropriately with Abalos’ conception of the personal face of the self is th  
role that the imagination plays for Kierkegaard in bringing the individual to authentic 
selfhood. For Kierkegaard, the embryo stage of authentic selfhood starts with the 
individual “imaginatively” conceiving of different possibilities and life-spheres and then 
deciding which possibility to actualize.   
  The second aspect of Abalos’ conception of the self is the political face of our 
being. This aspect of the self refers to “what we can and need to do together-together 
within ourselves, together with others, together in history, and together with the 
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sacred.”67 What is it that we can and need to do at the diverse levels of “togetherness”? 
For Abalos, the can and need in the way of life of transformation is cashed out in these 
terms: there remains the n ed for the Latino male to free himself from the dangerous 
archetypal stories of patriarchy so that the Latino male c n become a whole and complete 
self.  In practical terms, this need at the level of transformation is simply the need for 
“understanding our shared life and the need to experience justice, friendship, love, joy, 
and beauty.”68 Very quickly, for Abalos, the personal face of our being (reflecting on our 
own personal situation) gives rise to the political face of our being (seeking the help of
others in the task of transformation). In other words, it is one thing to recognize the n ed 
for self-transformation, but it is another matter altogether to strategize about how this can 
be done within one’s current historical situation.  
The process of transformation takes place first of all in our individual depths, our personal face. 
Only a person can choose to be political. Our personal face is necessary as we choose to be 
political to bring about a new turning point in the creation of a new history…to resist the racism 
that erases the humanity of our personal face requir s s to struggle against structural deformation 
in the society that continues to cripple us and others. We need to enact the political face of our 
being by asking always what we can and need to do tgether with our neighbors in order to 
liberate ourselves from the dramas practiced by our culture and the wider society that wound us 
(Abalos T 2007). 
The Latino male recognizes that this vocation is certainly more than a single olitary 
effect of the individual, but rather an essentially political move by which the Latino male 
comes to understand that he is going to need the help of others working together.  
 The third aspect of the self for Abalos is the historical face or aspect of ourbeing. 
For Abalos, the historical face of our being refers to “our experience over time, not only 
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our past, but also our present and future.”69 The historical face of the Latino male is 
cashed out in terms of understanding what stories possessed us in the past or continue to 
possess us, what stories are we continuing to preserve (in spite of being wounded by 
them), and certainly what new stories do we still need to create in the future. In other 
words, for Abalos, the Latino male critically reflects upon his historical past, but also 
makes “history by enacting the historical face of his being- creating a new turning point 
by struggling with both the immediate concrete tyranny and its underlying forming 
source.”70 Putting it all together, we can see what Abalos has in mind here. The Latino 
male must first put forward to himself his current situation (the personal face) and the 
need for transformation. Next, he makes his personal anguish political by reaching 
outside of himself to seek help from the community working together. Furthermore, thes  
archetypal stories are critically evaluated among the community and determined which 
stories are dangerous and counter-productive. The latter activity is historical because the 
journey of transformation begins in the Latino male’s current historical situation of 
bondage and from there inroads to liberation and transformation can begin to take shape.  
 At this point, it may be tempting to rebuke Kierkegaard for his individualism by 
pointing out that Kierkegaard virtually ignored the historical and political face of our 
being, to use Abalos’ language, in order to exclusively promote the personal face ofour 
being.  Although I am aware of such a popular reading of Kierkegaard does exist, 
however I’m persuaded that this isn’t quite right. As I have discussion in chapter one, 
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Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the self and subjectivity over and against the community was 
not his personal agenda writ large but rather a means to an end- calling out the individual 
from within the dead right-wing Hegelian orthodoxy. Furthermore, I maintain th t 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the self and subjectivity is political and historical in the sense 
that the individual is asked to imaginatively conceive of alternative life-sphere 
possibilities. This act can be, and often is very political in that the individual is daring to 
put forward counter-cultural thoughts, ideas, and life-spheres that strike against the 
established tradition and the status quo. Moreover, Kierkegaard never sought to remove 
the task to become a self from of the historical arena. That is, Kierkegaard never advis d 
the individual to turn his back on the now and historical and retreat into his personal, 
private religious salvation. In fact, Kierkegaard not only begins his own philosophical 
quandaries from within his current political, historical, and theological situation but 
denies that we can begin from anywhere else. In CUP, Kierkegaard never gets tired of 
reminding his audience that a god’s-eye view point was not available to humanity but 
rather we begin with our own existence. 
 The fourth aspect of the self for Abalos is the sacred face of aspect of our being. 
This aspect of the self is the most vague of the faces of our being, in Abalos’ writings. At 
times Abalos uses the terms “the sacred” and “the sacred face of our being” 
interchangeably as if they were the same thing.  Thus, sometimes is difficult to discern 
exactly what he means. However, it seems fair to say that what Abalos is getting at is 1) 
there exists an underlying spiritual force, and 2) we have all have a connection and 




“sacred” refers to a pantheistic spirituality that is the underlying force which grounds 
everything.  
The sacred permeates our lives and as one of the four faces of our being is always an aspect of our 
response to the world around us. We enact all of the s ories of our lives, our relationships, and the 
four faces of our being…but because we are not consci u  of the sacred in our lives it can posses 
us, especially through the stories that we practice... (Abalos T 2007). 
Of course Abalos is certainly not conceiving of the sacred in terms of a Western 
theological personal God, but rather a spiritual compassionate force. On the other hand, 
when Abalos refers to the “sacred face of our being” he is not only referring to our shared
human capacity for spirituality, but also to unique interconnectedness that we have the 
sacred. Abalos writes these words in reference to a Muslim mystical tradition that names 
every person as another face of the deepest sacred, “This is an ontological statement, an 
affirmation of our own sacredness since we participate in a relationship of bi-unity with 
the deepest sacred source in order to finish creation” (Abalos T 2007). I turn now to 
discuss the final connection between Kierkegaard and Abalos.  
III.  The Ethical Obligation to Construct a Healthy Self 
 The ethical obligation feature in both Kierkegaard’s and Abalos’ theories have 
already been alluded to but I want to examine this connection in greater detail. The 
ethical obligation feature is a central component shared by both Kierkegaard and Abalos.
What I mean by ethical obligation is simply that both Kierkegaard and Abalos impress 
upon their readers a sense of what ought to be done. In other words, both Kierkegaard 
and Abalos cast their “stage theories” in terms of an ethical obligation for the individual- 
it is one’s duty to become a complete and authentic self. Kierkegaard comments on this 




Every human being must be assumed to possess essentially what belongs essentially to being a 
human being. The subjective thinker’s task is to transform himself into an instrument that clearly 
and definitely expresses in existence the essentially human (CUP VII; 309). 
Ethics focuses upon the individual, and the ethically understood it is every individual’s task to 
become a whole human being, just as it is the presuposition of ethics that everyone  is born in 
that state of being able to become that…and if ever so many cowardly and mediocre and 
bedazzled individuals join forces and abandon themselve  in order to become something en masse 
with the help of the generation (CUP VII; 300). 
Likewise, for Abalos, a sense of ethical obligation and duty permeates his theory of 
transformation. Abalos is not simply presenting a social scientific descriptive account of 
certain behavioral patterns found within the Latino community. Rather, if I could mix my 
metaphors here, Abalos (similar to Anti-Climacus in SUD) is diagnosing a severe 
problem in the Latino community and he is prescribing a remedy to the problem.  
To journey through the story of transformation as the core drama of life is the vocation to which 
all humans are called. A decisive break through has been accomplished when Latino males realize 
that their greatest freedoms are to (1) become consci us of the archetypal way of life, stories, and 
relationships they are living, (2) prepare themselves to choose some and reject others, and (3) 
participate in creating more loving and just archetypal stories and relationships in the service of 
transformation (D. T. Abalos 2002). 
Moreover Abalos goes on to say, “the way of life of transformation provides the only 
context within which Latino males can express the wholeness of the personal, political, 
historical, and sacred faces of our being” (61). In other words, the remedy to the 
problems that Latino males face is found exclusively in the way of transformatin.  
Kierkegaard’s Contribution to Latino Male Self-transformation 
In this final section of the thesis, I want to bring out some of the features in both 
Kierkegaard’s conceptions of the self and subjectivity that I believe can provide insight 
and make a genuine contribution to Latino male self-transformation. In order to help with 




under two broad headings: Kierkegaard’s self and Latino male self-transformation and 
Kierkegaard’s subjectivity and Latino male self-transformation. 
I. Kierkegaard’s Self and Latino male self-transformation 
Before I demonstrate how Kierkegaard’s remarks on the self can be applied to th  
problem of Latino male self-transformation, I will briefly recap some of his remarks on 
the self. Kierkeggard’s self is a three-part being, I have labeled the irresolute, the 
resolute, and the spiritual-dependent self. The irresolute self is the aspect of the self 
whereby one is indecisively torn between one’s facticity and one’s possible future. This 
aspect of Kierkegaard’s self sets on display the individual’s facticity and the individual’s 
self presentation of, via the imagination, different possible states of affairs. The resolute 
self is the aspect of the self whereby the individual chooses resolutely to be the s lf that 
the individual wants to be. This aspect of Kierkegaard’s self not only demonstrates elf 
reflectivity and self-introspection, but also an estimation of the self in and throug  moral 
categories. Lastly, Kierkegaard’s third aspect of the self, the spiritual-dependent self, 
reveals a relational aspect necessary for the development of a whole and healthy self. 
This relational aspect of the self dependent on the “other” is vital for the task of 
constructing a self that is an authentic and whole self as opposed to a fragmented and 
partial self. The latter task, for Kierkegaard, involves vulnerability and depen nce upon 
someone outside and beyond the solitary individual.71 
Kierkegaard’s remarks on the self are invaluable to Latino male self-
transformation in these four ways (1) the Latino male must begin with his current 
                                                          
 




situation, that is, with his facticity, (2) the Latino male must imaginatively conceive of a 
different and better state of affairs, (3) the Latino male, for the first time, becomes aware 
of his own estimation of himself in and through moral categories, and (4) the project to 
become a whole self is not a solitary project, but requires the Latino male to seek help 
from the “other.” 
 Latino male self-transformation must begin in our current historical situation. In 
other words, Latinos must begin with our facticity- the arena in which we are born. Some 
Latinos have certain abilities and talents where as other Latinos do not, some Latinos are 
well-to-do while most are not, some Latinos have resources (economic, social, political 
etc.) available to them whereas most Latinos do not. The Latino male’s facticity, I 
confess, is not pretty and anything to be admired in many cases. Latinos still account for 
the most high school drop-outs compared to Anglos and African-Americans.72 The 
numbers get worst with higher education and in particular with Latino representation in 
academic philosophy (both student and faculty representation).73 With all this said, it may 
be tempting for some Latinos to make excuses for why they do not and will not 
participate in self-transformation, but Kierkegaard’s advice is, “No more excus s!” This 
may seem harsh but self-transformation begins with an honest face-to-face confrontation 
of our own facticity (as unpleasant as it might be); it begins with playing the cards we 
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 In 2008, regarding high school drop-out rates in America, Whites scored the lowest drop-out 
rate with the indicator score of 4.8, Blacks scored 9.9, whereas Latinos scored 18.3. 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16  
73
 For more on these stats see, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Lat nos in America: Philosophy and Social 





have been dealt, so to speak. For example, confronting one’s facticity for the Latino 
involves looking at one’s current historical situation. The latter task is more than just 
looking at a list of objective stats pertaining to Latinos in education or Latinos in the
business sector, but rather it is internalizing these stats. In other words, it is ident fying 
with these “facts” about Latino males and saying, “these facts are my facts….these facts 
are my people’s historical situation…no excuses!”  
 After confronting our facticity, Latinos must now imagine a fundamentally 
different and better state of affairs. That is, Latinos must conceive of a different set of 
possibilities. For some Latinos it may be imagining a life absent of gang affiliation, for 
others it may be imagining a life in higher education, while for others it may be 
conceiving of a life without emotional and physical abuse. The point here is that insted 
of becoming embittered within his or her own facticity, Latinos can and must conceive of 
a healthy and better way of life. To echo Abalos, Latinos must empty ourselves of th  
destructive ways of life and create new ways of life. The latter task for the Latino male 
involves seeking out ideal Latino male role models within the Latino community and 
outside the Latino community. These role models may be family members, teachers, 
reformers, friends, clergy-personnel so as long as those who the Latino male imit t s is 
no longer bound by the destructive stories of patriarchy.  
 However, just conceiving of a different state of affairs is not enough. The Latino 
male must also become aware of his own estimation of himself. Recall for a m ment 
Kierkegaard’s remarks on the aspect of the self as th t which relates itself to itself. I 
argued that this is not merely introspective and reflective activity (the mind thinking of its 




a synthesis of contrasting factors. In addition to this, it is one’s consciousness of one’s 
inability to integrate the self (because of weakness of will) and it is one’s consciousness 
of itself under a moral obligation to become a self. In other words, the introspective 
activity is performed from the particular moral category. The moral category is the duty 
to become an authentic self- one takes serious for the first time in one’s life the moral 
task to become a self. Well this may have been fine and well for Kierkegaard, but what 
could this all possibly mean for Latino male self-transformation? 
 I think the former Kierkegaardian remarks are still fresh and relevant for Latino 
male self-transformation. Once the Latino male conceives of a different and better state 
of affairs, I submit that the Latino male needs to make an introspective appraisl of his 
own thinking about Latino male self-transformation. Furthermore, the latter is performed 
from a certain moral standpoint, that of the duty to become an authentic self.  
 Latino males need to introspectively appraise and evaluate their thinking about 
Latino male self-transformation itself. I’m not simply saying that Latino males need only 
to think critically about problems related to Latino males, but rather we need to think 
critically about our own thinking about problems related to Latino males. Suppose the 
Latino male conceives of different life-possibilities (better ways of life). At what point 
does all mental activity become an actual project of becoming a whole and complete self 
for the Latino male? In other words, when does the Latino male resolutely decide that the 
task to become a complete self is indeed a task he oughtundertake? I submit that when 
the Latino male reflects upon his condition (his facticity and his possibilities) and thinks 
about his thinking regarding his condition (thinks of his own thinking of his facticity and 




example, Pedro has become convinced that the patriarchal ways of life he has inherited 
are not only destructive to himself but ultimately destructive to Latinas and the en ire 
Latino community. Pedro now conceives or puts forward to himself different ways of life
and alternative life possibilities.  Eventually, Pedro takes an estimation of his mental 
activity (he introspectively thinks of his thinking about his actual life situation). In the 
activity of introspection, Pedro questions why he is thinking about such matters and why 
such matters are important for himself and others around him in the first place. Pedro 
rightly concludes that the inherited stories of patriarchy are morally wrong and need to 
stop. As a result of such introspective thinking, Pedro considers it now his duty to 
transform himself into a complete self. At this point, Pedro is now introspecting through a 
moral lens, a la Kierkegaard, a category in which it is now Pedro is highest task to
become a self.     
 Lastly, Kierkegaard’s remarks on the spiritual-dependent self are also invaluable 
to Latino male self-transformation in terms of becoming vulnerable by seeking help from 
the other. I have already shown that for Kierkegaard by cashing out the third aspect of the 
self as dependent on the “other” (I have argued that the “other” need not be God) this 
brings out the relational aspect of becoming a self. Furthermore, Kierkegaard is able to 
bring out the aspect of failing to become a self because one refuses to be dependent on 
the other. How does this all relate to Latino male self-transformation? 
 After the Latino male make it his highest priority to become a healthy and whole 
self, it is imperative that he seek help from others inside and outside the Latino
community. Again, consider Pedro in his journey to become a complete self. Pedro’s 




That is, Pedro’s self is in some way dependent upon who he keeps company with and 
who he surrounds himself with. Again, if Pedro surrounds himself with positive Latino 
role models then this will help his task of self-transformation. It is imperativ  that Latino 
males seek out other Latino males that have rejected the archetypal stories of patriarchy 
and have moved on to create better ways of life. Part of the reason that Latino males fail 
to become a complete self is because many Latino males refuse to seek help from other 
males. To seek out help requires both vulnerability and humility in that one has to open 
up and seek the help of the “other” and this may require admitting that one needs help or 
that one has made a mistake. Again, for Latino males, the latter is commonly understood 
to be a sign of weakness and thus many Latino males fail to actualize the task to become 
a whole and complete self. Now I want to turn to Kierkegaard’s remarks on subjectivity 
and bring to light his contribution to this contemporary problem. 
II.  Kierkegaard’s Subjectivity and Latino Male Self-Transformation 
Kierkegaard’s remarks on subjectivity are also invaluable in the service of Latino 
male self-transformation in these three ways (1) the Latino male can orient his mind to 
think subjectively about problems related to his own existence, (2) the Latino male can 
utilize “double-reflection” in attempting to apply “knowledge” to his existence, (3) and 
the Latino male is able to put into practice the insights of Kierkegaardian inward ess, 
existence, and passion. 
If we take Kierkegaard’s distinction on objective thinking and subjective thinking 
and apply to our discussion of Latino male self-transformation, some important features 




thinking about it subjectively as opposed to thinking about it objectively To be sure, - (we 
can easily imagine what thinking objectively about this problem would look like- through 
a social scientific detached set of lens, and I don’t necessary disapprove of such an 
inquiry, I simply want to keep in mind Kierkegaard’s distinction between subjective and 
objective thinking) and bring out certain existential features to bear on this current 
problem. In other words, just as Abalos has maintained, the problem Latino male self-
transformation is more than simply a problem of quantifiable stats and ethnic 
demographics, but rather it is, a la Kierkegaard, an existential problem too. It is a 
problem that requires Latino males to think critically about their own existence. Again, 
lest we forgot what is at stake here, I’m not suggesting, nor would Kierkegaard, that 
Latino males are to run off to seek refuge in private seclusion in order to engage in 
existential thought. What’s being communicated here is that Latino male self-
transformation is to some degree an existential problem because the Latino mle is being 
asked to think about his life in terms of what it means to really exist. Although I do not 
deny the value in thinking about this current problem objectively -it does have its place- 
but along with Kierkegaard I maintain that we cannot lose sight that this is an existential 
problem as well. It is a problem that Latino males must at some point bring to bear n 
their own existence. 
Once Latino males approach the problem of self-transformation through a 
subjective and existential set of lens, then it remains the task of the Latino to wrestle with 
how to apply the antidote to their lives. In other words, it is one thing to have a wealth of 
knowledge on Latino males, but it is another thing to take this knowledge and determine 




Kierkegaard’s notion of “double reflection” is of importance here. Recall that for 
Kierkegaard, the first reflection refers to the passing of knowledge (communicating) from 
one speaker to the hearer. Again, we can imagine what this would look like in an 
academic setting. Suppose Pedro has attended a series of lectures on dealing with Latino 
male self-transformation. Suppose further that Pedro was an attentive listen r and jotted 
down notes of what he considered to be of importance. At this point, Kierkegaard would 
suggest that the type of reflection that has occurred is first reflection, the passage of 
information from the speaker to the listener. However, Kierkegaard would point out that 
the task is unfinished because given the subject matter (Latino male self-transformation is 
an existential problem) it requires double reflection.  Double reflection is the type of 
reflection in which the hearer takes the information communicated (first reflection) and 
then struggles to appropriate and integrate into one’s life. In other words, in order for 
existential communication to take place, Pedro must take what is communicated at the 
lecture series and determine how this “information” can be graphed into his existence.  
Finally, Kierkegaard’s characterization of subjectivity in terms of inwardness, 
existence, and passion are also useful in our dialogue. For Kierkegaard, the notion of 
inwardness referred to activity whereby the individual would put him or herself in a 
position to be left alone, especially from social roles and social status, in order to 
contemplate concerns of an existential nature. Now such private contemplation is not for 
its own sake, but rather to the individual to take action concerning becoming a self. For 
many Latinos a good dose of inwardness would not entirely be a bad thing. Many Latino 
males have in fact inherited and assumed very dangerous social roles such as macismo 




male to strip away those carefully constructed social roles which he has inherited and 
evaluate his values and projects in vulnerable isolation.  
Furthermore, Kierkegaard would then require of the Latino male to begin to exist. 
Of course Kierkegaard was not talking about mere biological existence, he is referring to 
a unique type of existence in which the individual engages in a struggle to bring together 
the temporal and the eternal. What could all this mean for Latino male self-
transformation? Again, I think that Kierkegaard’s insight here is useful.  
For Kierkegaard, the individual must struggle with taking ethical ideals and duties 
(the eternal) and attempt to apply them to one’s existence (the temporal). That is, Latino 
males, once confronted with the problem of self-transformation, must now attempt to 
bring these ideals and moral duties into their existence and their facticity (the temporal). 
This is not easy to do. Consider the case of Pedro again. After Pedro has receiving 
invaluable information regarding self-transformation (first reflection) and then attempts 
to integrate this information into his life (double reflection), he now has to take these 
ethical ideals and moral duties (the eternal) and apply them to his current real life 
situation; his facticity (the temporal). That is, the difficult task remains for Pedro to take 
the antidote of self-transformation back into the patriarchal workplace or the patriarchal 
barrio. How can such a difficult task be performed? Kierkegaard’s remarks on passion 
seem to help answer this question. 
For Kierkegaard, the passions were not merely uncalculated bursts of emotion, 
but rather were a kin to what we mean by values. Values, for Kierkegaard could be honed 




example, Pedro realizes his finite and temporal limitations (perhaps coming from a lower 
social-economic class and having a certain physical abnormality), yet heimagines and 
presents to himself the non-actual (the possible- perhaps possibilities of a different life). 
All that has gone on in Pedro at this point is reflection and thought. What is now needed 
is for Pedro to bring to close the reflective process of imagination (conceptualizing the 
various possibilities) and take a certain course of action; however, this can only happen 
when Pedro decides to act. Pedro is moved to action by employing Kierkegaardian 
passion.
In sum, I have brought to the surface some of Kierkegaard’s claims regarding the 
self in terms of one’s facticity, imaginatively conceiving of different and better ways of 
life, moral introspection, and seeking help from others. I have also pointed to 
Kierkegaard’s remarks on subjectivity as helpful sign posts in the journey of Latino male 
self-transformation. The sign posts discussed were subjective thinking, double reflection, 
and Kierkegaardian subjectivity in terms of inwardness, existence, and passion. I’m 
persuaded that Kierkegaard’s ideas on the self and subjectivity can and do in fact provide










The goal of this thesis has been to explore Kierkegaard’s conceptions of the self 
and subjectivity and then to apply Kierkegaard’s insight on these matters to the 
contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Kierkegaard is commonly 
viewed as the standard of introverted and selfish thinking; however, I have demonstrated 
that this view is not quite right. Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with the self and 
subjectivity does not necessarily negate and short circuit attempting real solutions to real 
life social problems. On the contrary, I have demonstrated that Kierkegaard’s insight on 
the self and subjectivity can provide Latino males with real life tools for dealing with real 
life problems concerning self-transformation. These tools are invaluable for the Latino 
male to not only dislodge himself from the dangerous social archetypes of patriarchy, but 
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The Metaphysics of Identity 
Throughout the entirety of the thesis, specifically in chapter three, I have spok n 
of Latino male self-transformation. Obviously the term, ‘Latino/a’ is an eth ic and social 
label that picks out a certain ethnic and social identity. However, all such talk 
presupposes a notion of identity which in turn presupposes a certain understanding of the 
concept ‘identity’ itself. An exhaustive conceptual analysis of the term ‘identity’ and the 
philosophical problem of identity is beyond the scope of this work, nevertheless a few 
remarks are necessary.74  
As I mentioned earlier, the name ‘Latino/a’ is a socially constructed ethnic label, 
but what are we to make of the term, ‘identity’? Whether or not ethnic labels/ names and 
ethnic identities are desirable and useful is another matter altogether; my concern right 
                                                          
 
74 In what follows, my discussion on identity will aim to get clear on personal identity as opposed 
to the general metaphysical issue of identity. The general metaphysical issue of identity seeks to give
account of the relation that each thing bears just to itself. For example, at is apt to consider Leibniz’s law at 
this point. Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals: (x)(y) [(x=y)→(P)(Px↔Py)] states that for any 
x and any y, if they are indeed identical to each other, then for any property P, P will be true of x i and only 
if P is true of y. This principal sheds light on the statement, “Mark Twain is quantitatively identical to 
Samuel Clemens.” Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens are quantitatively identical just in case they share all 
properties in common with itself. That is to say, if we can find one thing that is true of x (Mark Twain) that 
is not the same of y (Samuel Clemens), then it follows that x and y are not identical, indeed they would be 
different. However, my discussion on identity will be limited to personal identity not the general 





now is the term ‘identity’ because however ethnic identity or racial identity is cashed out; 
they all presuppose a generic notion of identity.   
Unpacking the notion of identity requires us to venture into metaphysics. That is, 
when referring to identity, social or otherwise, there are always metaphysical 
assumptions and commitments presupposed from the outset. Thus, any discussion about 
Latino male self-transformation necessitates disambiguating the term, ‘identity’ and 
getting clear on what the nature of identity amounts to.  
When philosophers discuss the nature of identity, they usually have in mind the 
problem of identity. In order get at what the problem of identity amounts to, consider the 
four different questions below:  
1) What is it for X to be identical to/ be the same entity as X irrespective of 
time? 
2) What is it for X to be identical to/ be the same entity as X at a certain 
moment in time? 
3) What is it for X to be identical to/ be the same entity as X through time? 
4) What kind of criteria is available in order for us to know that a given X 
and Y are identical 
 
The first three questions are metaphysical questions, whereas question four is an 
epistemological question.75  Question one is the generic metaphysical question regarding 
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 Questions 1 through 3 take a metaphysical criterion as a criterion of personal identity such that 




identity without reference to time. In other words, the first question seeks to loca e the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of what makes entity X identical to X regardl ss of 
time. For example, what makes Juan Doe to be Juan Doe regardless of time is a question
of achronic identity. This is the philosophical problem of identity proper which seeks to 
establish what makes a thing be the thing it is. Answers to this question in referec  to 
the identity (achronic identity) of Juan Doe have varied from Descartes substantial self or 
ego to Hume’s bundle of perceptions.76 Suppose we dilate on this point further. We can 
see that those that maintain the Soul theory of personal identity maintain that the achronic 
personal identity of the person resides in some kernel that is the soul, the ego, or the self 
which is not only the ground of all personal experiences but is present throughout the 
person’s life. On the other hand, proponents of the Bundle theory of personal identity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
an epistemological criterion as a criterion of personal identity such that x provides an explanation of how 
we can know what y’s nature consists in.  
 
76 René Descartes notion of achronic identity emerges in his discussion on the self in Meditation I 
and II . In his quest to find the one indubitable truth, cogito ergo sum, Descartes is lead to the conclusion 
that his he is a ‘thinking thing’ in addition to his physical body. For Descartes, the true “achronic identity” 
of himself is the simple and indivisible, “I” present throughout his life; John Cottingham, The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 18-19.  On 
the other hand, David Hume blasted such a notion of substantial self. Via Hume’s epistemology, Hume 
demonstrates that he has no sense impressions of a substantial self or “I”, but rather all he is aware of is one 
sense impression after another. For Hume, the errorin positing “the self” is a result of a confusion in which 
the connectedness of consciousness is mistaken for the existence of a soul. That is, the unity and the 
continuity of one’s perceptions (they are occurring i  a single-sense perceiving individual) leads us 
mistakenly to posit the existence of an underlying “real” container or substratum of our perceptions. 
However, Hume argues that no such substratum can be found, only one perception after another: 
 For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, 
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception…I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed ach other with an inconceivable rapidity, and 





denies that there is any such soul or substantial self, instead all there is regarding achronic 
personal identity is a collection or a bundle of perceptions one following the other. 
Before moving on to discuss questions two and three, I will tie the former remarks 
to the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Suppose that someone 
claimed that there is a growing need in the Latino community for Latino males to 
undergo self-transformation because of the damage being inflicted to the Latino himself 
and others in the community as a whole. The metaphysical assumptions in the former 
claim are numerous but for my discussion notice the claim assumes some generic 
metaphysical notion of identity. What is the Latino that being referred to? Is the La ino a 
substantial self, ego, soul, or a collection and parade of mental events? Again, a host of 
metaphysical assumptions underlie the former claim regarding Latino male self-
transformation. 
Now questions two and three are particular types of metaphysical questions of 
identity with respect to time. Question two seeks to understand what it is for X to be X at 
one particular moment in time. This is referred to as synchronic identity because it seeks 
to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of X to be the thing it is a particular 
moment in time. For example, what makes Juan Doe to be Juan Doe at time T¹ is a 
question regarding synchronic identity of Juan Doe. Question three, on the other hand, 
seeks to understand the identity of some entity through the passage of time. What makes 
Juan Doe to be Juan Doe at two or more different times is a question of diachronic 
identity because it seeks to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of X to be 
the thing is it at time T¹, T², and so forth (Gracia 2000). Before moving on to question 




First, in respect to diachronic identity, a further distinction can be made between 
quantitative and qualitative diachronic identity. For example, Juan Doe at time T¹ is 
diachronically identical to Juan Doe at time T² if and only if Juan Doe is the same person
at time T² as he was at time T¹. The latter conditional refers to numerical or quantitative 
identity because the same entity is present at both times. However, we can also spe k of 
Juan Doe being diachronically identical (or not) to Juan Doe at different times if and only 
if his character or personality is qualitatively the same. Again, this sense of identity refers 
to qualitative identity as opposed to numerical identity. We can speak in general 
categories of diachronic identity of Juan Doe in terms of Juan Doe at time T¹ being Juan 
Doe at time T² just in case he is numerically or quantitatively the same person, but Juan 
Doe at time T¹ not being Juan Doe at time T² just in case his personality has changed over 
time. Thus, we can meaningfully speak of identity in two different senses. We can spe k 
of some X being numerically identical to X, but X not being qualitatively identical to X.  
Of course this now raises the problem regarding what makes somebody the same 
person (in a quantitative or numeric sense) at different times. Regarding the former
problem, here is brief display of some of the most popular general criteria that have been 
proposed to answer the following: X at time T¹ is the same person as Y at time T² if and 
only if: 
1) Y has the same soul as X (the Soul theory) 
2) Y has the same body as X (the Body theory) 
3) Y has the same brain as X (the Brain theory) 




At this time I cannot provide an exhaustive treatment of the various theories above, but a 
few comments are in order. Proponents of the Soul theory can refer to the substantial soul 
or ego that persists and is present throughout time. Again, the drawback on this account is 
how could we ever know and verify that there is a substantial soul that persists 
throughout time and is present at all times.77 However, Bundle theorists would have to 
demonstrate what Bundle is crucial for one’s continued numeric identity.  
On the other hand, Body theorists can point to the body as criterion of what 
accounts for X’s persistent identity through time. That is, just in case X has the same 
body at any given time as Y can both X and Y be said to be the same. John Locke in 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) via his famous thought experiment, The 
Prince and the Cobbler, opposed both Soul and Body theories.78 Locke asks us to 
                                                          
 
77 I need to make some crucial and subtle distinctions here in the discussion in order to avoid 
equivocating. The objection that soul or the self cannot be what accounts for the persistent of X at different 
times because we could never know if indeed a soul or self in fact exists, is really an issue regarding a  
epistemological sense of criterion. That is, the objection to the account of diachronic quantitative id ntity 
located in a soul or a self is an objection that is sking how we could ever know that there is a soulor a self 
on empirical grounds. However, there are two different senses of criterion that are independent of one 
another: a metaphysical sense of criterion and an epistemological sense of criterion. For example, even if 
we could never know or verify empirically that there is indeed a soul or a substantial self that remains 
throughout time, it could be still be true that diachronic quantitative personal identity consists in the 
sameness of a soul or substantial self. But issue her  is the metaphysical sense of criterion. In other words, 
we want to know what the nature of identity consists n regardless of whether or not we could ever know 
(epistemological sense of criterion) if that nature obtains in any particular case.   
79 John Locke seems to be the first philosopher to address the problem of personal identity is its 
current and modern form. Locke argues in favor of the memory theory via his famous thought experiment, 








consider the soul of a prince, carrying with it his stream of consciousness. Suppose we 
were to switch the prince’s stream of consciousness with that of a cobbler. The person 
with the prince’s body would now seem to remember the thoughts and experiences of the 
cobbler, and the person with the cobbler’s body would now also seem to remember the 
thoughts and experiences of the prince (2.27.15). Would the person in the prince’s body 
now be the cobbler? We intuitively think that the person who wakes up with same stream 
of consciousness is the same person who had the same stream of consciousness even 
though their physical bodies are now different.79 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
79 Other key essays, in my opinion, that should be consulted when wrestling with issues of 
providing an account of personal identity are: John Perry’s “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and 
Immortality,” in which all four criteria are represented. In the essay, the dying philosophy professor 
(Gretchen Weirob) wants to know whether or not it’s po sible to survive the death of her body. The 
clergyman (Sam Miller) and former graduate student (Dave Cohen) both try to defend the criteria that 
allows for immortality. In the end professor Weirob (representing the Body theory) seems to win the debate 
albeit she does pass away. In Derek Parfits essay, “The Unimportance of Identity” he argues that when it 
comes to caring about my future it matters far lessthat it’s my future (that the future person will be me) as 
opposed to that the future person will be related to me in the right way psychologically. In other words, 
personal identity just isn’t important to the things that really do matter in our lives.  
 
